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. Introduction
Imagine the following scenario: An unknown attacker sexually assaults
a woman. As is the case with most sexual assaults, the attacker leaves behind
some type of evidence from which authorities can obtain his DNA. However,
not knowing the identity of the attacker precludes the police from attempting
to match the DNA evidence collected at the crime scene to a sample taken
directly from a suspect. Therefore, in their attempt to apprehend the assailant,
the police use traditional investigative tactics such as interviewing the victim
and searching for potential witnesses. Unless these tools produce a suspect,
the crime is likely to remain unsolved, and if there is an applicable statute of
limitations, eventually it will expire and shield the attacker from criminal
liability. This hypothetical situation describes the reality that occurs in many
sexual assault cases. If a new law enforcement tactic gains acceptance, how-
ever, the potential criminal defendant might not go unpunished.
The advent of DNA identification techniques gives police and the courts
a greater ability to identify the perpetrators of crimes.1 For example, police
already use DNA identification techniques to prove the guilt of defendants by
matching evidence from a crime scene to a sample collected from a suspect.2
Police also use these identification techniques to exonerate defendants who
either are accused of a crime or who are convicted and then subsequently
released based on newly discovered DNA evidence.3 DNA identification
helps solve various types of criminal cases including murder, robbery, and
kidnaping; however, sexual assault cases account for the majority of DNA
identification cases.' While DNA identification evidence generally has gained
widespread acceptance,' a recently employed prosecution tactic is pushing the
1. See Walter F. RoweForewordto EDWARD CONNORSET AL.,U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CONVICTED BY JURiES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVi-
DENCE TO ESTABUSH INNOCENCE AFrER TRIAL, atxv (1996) (stating that DNA technology has
given police and courts means of identifying rapists and murderers with high degree of confi-
dence).
2. See infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text (discussing state court cases in which
court admitted DNA identification evidence that led to conviction or guilty plea).
3. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing case in which court initially
convicted defendant of rape and murder and subsequently released him on basis of DNA
evidence).
4. See George W. Clarke & Catherine Stephenson, Forewordto EDWARD CoNNORS ET
AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES
IN THE USE OF DNAEVIDENCE TO ESTABIISH INNOCENCEAFrER TRI, at xxiii (1996) (noting
that despite use of DNA identification in various types of crimes, majority of DNA investiga-
tions involve sexual assault cases because perpetrator is likely to leave significant physical evi-
dence in such cases).
5. See infra Part 113 (discussing initial court decisions regarding DNA evidence and
noting that United States judicial system regularly admits DNA evidence).
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envelope of legally-accepted DNA identification.6
In early September 1999, Milwaukee Assistant DistrictAttorneyNorman
Gain filed rape and kidnaping charges against an assailant identified only by
his genetic profile! In the criminal complaint used to obtain the arrest war-
rant, Gahn did not charge the assailant according to his name, as traditionally
done in securing an arrest warrant instead, Gahn described the assailant only
by his DNA profile.' Specifically, the assailant is known only as "'John Doe,
unknown male' with matching DNA 'at genetic locations D1S7, D2S44,
D5Sl10, D10S28 and D17S79."'9 Gahn's purpose in obtaining the arrest
warrant was clear: he was attempting to stop the statute of limitations clock
so that he could prosecute the assailant were he identified in the future. 10 Law
enforcement hopes that this practice will become increasingly likely when
DNA databanks have amassed more data." Gahn was the first prosecutor to
6. See Julian E. Barnes, East Side Rapls4 Known Solely by DNA, Is Indicted, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at BI (discussing Manhattan prosecutors procurement of indictment
against East Side rapist based solely on series of genetic markers and noting concern over use
of DNA indictments to circumvent statutes of limitations); David Doege, Novel Warrant IDs
Suspect Only by DNA: DatabankEvidence Used to Charge tIohn Doe'in Rape, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTHEL, Sep. 2, 1999, at I (noting view that this new tactic will raise legal issues such as
whether it constitutes reliable identifying information); David Hafetz, DNA Is Used to Indict
Unknown Man in Rape, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 4, 2000, at Al (noting use of DNA
profiling to obtain indictment of John Doe for 1995 rape of South Austin woman and stating
that some people criticize this new law enforcement technique); Erin Hallissy & Charlie Good-
year, Databank Match Brings Arrest on DNA Warrant First Such Case Raises Civil Liberty
Issues, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 2000, at A3 (noting effect of DNA warrants is to circumvent
statutes of limitations).
7. See Doege, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that police and prosecutor filed sexual assault
and kidnaping charges in warrant and criminal complaint that identified assailant only by DNA
profiles found at five genetic locations).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. (noting that time was running out to identify three-time rapist before statute
of limitations expired).
11. See NAT'L CoMM'N ON TBE FUTURBE OF. DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
POsTcONVICrION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 29 (1999)
[hereinafter DOJ II] ("[DNA] databases have been constructed and are continuing to be ex-
panded in many laboratories throughout the United States and the world with samples from
convicted sex offenders and convicted felons, as well as samples from unsolved crimes ....
These databases will be especially helpful for linking previously unrelated cases and for
screening a large number of known individuals already convicted of a crime to newly tested
crime scene samples."). The FBI has developed a program called the Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS) to link the many state-run databases to a national database. Stephen J. Niez-
goda, Jr. & Barry Brown, The FBI Laboratory's Combined DNA Index System Program, at
http'J/www.promega.com/geneticidproc/ussymp6prcc/niezgod.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2001).
CODIS uses two indexes to assist investigators when authorities uncover genetic evidence from
a crime scene. Id. One index catalogues DNA profiles of convicted sex offenders as well as
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gain widespread recognition for the use ofthis strategy.12 Since Gahn's initial
use of DNA profiling in obtaining arrest warrants, police and prosecutors in
other jurisdictions have used this technique to obtain arrest warrants or
indictments as a means of avoiding the statute of limitations.13 One of the
more noteworthy incidents of the use of DNA profiling occurred this past
March in New York when Manhattan prosecutors obtained a "John Doe"
indictment of a rapist identified only by his DNA profile. 4 Like the Milwau-
kee prosecutor, these prosecutors took this step to avoid having the statute of
limitations expire. 5 There also have been warrants issued or indictments
returned in other jurisdictions. 6
other violent criminals. Id. The other index catalogues DNA profiles obtained from crime
scene evidence. Id. CODIS uses computer software to search the convicted offender and
forensic indexes for matching DNA profiles. Id. While CODIS provides a national database
to search for DNA profile matches, states are still responsible for compiling their own data-
bases. See id. (noting that states' forensic laboratories have control over their own data). Due
to a lack of funding, however, only twenty-three states have tied into CODIS thus far. Erie
Slater, Rape Case DNA Tests the Limits: Milwaukee Uses Genetic Evidence to File Warrants
in Unsolved Crimes. National Databank Is Overwhelmed by Samples, Underfunded and
Undercoordinated, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at Al. In addition to funding problems, most
state databases have been unable to obtain timely DNA profiles on samples collected from
convicted felons, creating a tremendous backlog. See Erin Hallissy & Charlie Goodyear, How
DNA Fights Crime: Other States Make Better Use of Technology, S.F. CHRON., Oct 20,1999,
atAl (noting that labs have at least 500,000 samples to analyze). Consequently, DNA database
numbers are low in many states, which reduces the possibility for a match between a crime
scene sample and a sample from a database. See id. (noting that "even if police send in work
from crime scenes, there wouldn't necessarily be many known criminals to compare against the
DNA profiles").
12. See Doege, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that many believe Gahn's use of DNA arrest
warrant was first such effort in United States). Although Gahn may receive credit for being the
first to use this novel tactic, reports say it actually occurred in Kansas in 1991. See Barnes,
supra note 6, at B1 (noting at least one other use of DNA warrant).
13. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 6, at B1 (Manhattan); Audrey Cooper, WarrantBased
on DNA Leads toArrest, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRB., Oct 25,2000, at A3 (Sacramento); Robert
Gearty, DNA Used to Indict Hunted Serial Rapist, DAILY NEWS (New York), Aug. 9,2000, at
14 (Suffolk County, New York); Hafetz, supra note 6, atAl (Austin); Leslie Hoffman, Grand
Jury Indicts the DNA Profile of Unknown Rapist, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Apr. 20, 2000, at Al
(Albuquerque); Ed Timms, DNA Uncovers Pieces in Crime-Solving Puzzle; Tool's Value
Hailed, But Critics Warn of Abuses, DALLAS MORNnrG NEWS, Aug. 28, 2000, at 1A (Cass
County, Iowa); Michael Vigh, Utah Officials Charge Nameless Rape Suspect Based on DNA
Evidence, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 3,2000, atAl (Salt Lake City).
14. See Barnes, supra note 6, at B1 (describing police and prosecutor use of DNA pro-
filing to obtain indictment against "East Side Rapist").
15. See id. (noting that statute of limitations would expire four days after DNA indictment
of East Side Rapist).
16. See supra note 13 (listing other jurisdictions that have employed this DNA profiling
tactic in either arrest warrants or indictments).
DNA PROFILES AND "JOHN DOE"ARREST WARRANTS
To date, courts in only two states have ruled upon challenges to this
practice." However, the number of arrest warrants and indictments based
solely on DNA profiles has increased markedly since Gahn's use of DNA
profiling in 1999.18 In these cases, defendants have challenged the tactics that
the prosecutors utilized, but to no avail.19 Although some attorneys have
agreed with these defendants that such tactics are questionable," it remains
to be seen how courts will treat such cases in the future. A likely challenge
17. See infra notes 149-58 and accompanying text (discussing first court decisions on
validity of DNA warrant).
18. Since its first use in Wisconsin in 1999, use of this DNA profiling tactic has spread
quickly to otherjurisdictions. See Barnes, supra note 6, atB1 (discussing Manhattan prosecutor's
procurement of indictment against "East Side rapist" in March 2000); Cooper, supra note 13, at
A3 (noting arrest on DNA warrant in California in September 2000); Doege, supra note 6, at 1
(noting belief that Gahn's use of DNA arrest warrant in September 1999 was first such effort in
United States); Gearty, supra note 13, at 14 (noting DNAindictment used in Suffolk County, New
York in August 2000); Hafetz, supra note 6, at Al (noting use of DNA indictment in Austin in
November2000); Hoffman, supra note 13, at Al (noting use ofDNA indictment in Albuquerque
inApril2000); JoeLambe, Crime-SotMngMethodsOuIpaceStatutes ofLimitation, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Jan. 20, 2001, at Al (noting use of DNA indictment in Kansas City in January 2001);
Timms, supra note 13, at 1A (noting use of DNA in Cass County, Iowa, in case scheduled for late
2000); Vigh, supra note 13, atA1 (noting use ofDNAwarrant in Salt Lake City in March 2000).
19. See Doege, supra note 6, at 1 (noting defense attorney's remark that there is strong
ground to challenge DNA profiling tactic). In fact, a Sacramento man arrested for a 1994 rape
became the first such person arrested by warrant that identified the assailant by his DNA only.
Erin HallissyDNA ArrestMayBe Tossed on Technicality: Genetic Code Won'tFiton Suspect's
Warrant, S.F. CHRoN., Jan. 19,2001, atA8 [hereinafter Hallissy, DNA Arrest May Be Tossed].
Police arrested Paul Eugene Robinson on Sept. 15,2000, after the California DNA databank of
convicted felons connected him to an unsolved Sacramento rape. Id. The arrest warrant named
only a "John Doe," identified as a black male having a particular DNA profile obtained from evi-
dence gathered at the rape scene. Id. However, the arrest warrant did not contain the long DNA
profile itself because the district attorney's computer would not accept it Id. Robinson chal-
lenged the validity of the warrant, and the judge initially indicated that it may have been invalid
because state law calls for the identifying information to be contained on the warrant itself. Id.
Despite her initial indication to the contrary, the judge ruled that the warrant was valid. See Erin
Hallsy,Judge Upholds Use ofDNA Warrants: RulingAllowsStatute ofLimitationsLoophole,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Hallissy, Judge Upholds Use ofDNA Warrants]
(noting judge's ruling that prosecutors could identify suspect on arrest warrant using only his
DNA profile to circumvent statute oflimitations for rape). The California Supreme Court upheld
the circuitjudge's ruling,thus allowing Robinson's prosecution to continue. See Glenn Chapman,
High Court DNA Ruling Could Revolutionize Prosecution, Experts Say, AGENCE FRANCE-
PREssE, Aug. 10, 2001 (discussing California Supreme Court's refusal to dismiss charges against
suspected rapist Paul Robinson); inffra notes 149-58 and accompanying text (discussing first court
decisions, including recent Wisconsin court decision, regarding DNA warrants or indictments).
20. See Barnes, supra note 6, at BI (noting defense attorney's view that using DNA
indictments to circumvent statutes of limitations is questionable because time passage might
give rise to disappearance of exonerating evidence); Hallissy & Goodyear, supra note 6, at A3
(noting ACLU attorney's view that circumvention of statutes of limitations is legally question-
able in light of fact that purpose of such statutes is to ensure that defendants are able to put forth
effective defense).
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is that the genetic profile is not an adequate description of the suspect to
obtain a warrant or an indictment. The law in most states requires identifica-
tion of a suspect to contain a description by which someone may identify the
person with reasonable certainty'
Aside from this specific potential challenge, this practice raises questions
about the role of statutes of limitations in criminal law.' Statutes of limita-
tions serve many purposes, one of which is to preserve an individual's right
to defend himself.' When a prosecutor uses this DNA profiling technique to
circumvent the statute of limitations, more time may pass before the accused
may defend himself. With the passing of time, memories fade, attorneys and
police lose evidence, witnesses disappear, and as a result, the delay affects the
accused's ability to defend himself. 4
This Note addresses the possible legal challenges, as well as various
policy concerns, implicated by this relatively new prosecutorial tactic. Part I
briefly discusses some scientific background on the use of DNA, particularly
its use and reliability in criminal cases.' Part III addresses different jurisdic-
tions' requirements for identification of criminal suspects and discusses the
questions that courts will face in deciding challenges to this DNA identifica-
tion method.26 Part IV discusses the history and purposes of statutes of limita-
tions and the conflict between these statutes and this new DNA profiling
tactic.' Part V concludes that neither this prosecutorial tactic nor the legisla-
tive elimination of statutes of limitations represents sound public policy."
If. DNA Profiling Technology
A. Scientific Underpinnings
DNA profiling refers to the characterization of one or more compara-
tively rare features of an individual's genetic makeup. 9 With the exception
21. See infra note 99 (noting various state law provisions requiring description that
identifies suspect with reasonable certainty).
22. See infra Part IV.C (discussing use of DNA identification tactic to circumvent statutes
of limitations).
23. See infra notes IV.B and accompanying text (discussing purposes of statutes of limita-
tions).
24. See infra notes 169-89 and accompanying text (discussing effects of passage of'time
in crmninal cases).
25. See infra Part H (discussing DNA identification techniques already used in criminal
cases).
26. See infra Part III (discussing identification standards in federal and state law).
27. See infra Part IV (discussing conflicting goals of new DNA profiling tactic and
existing statutes of limitations).
28. See infra Part V (concluding that DNA warrants and indictments and elimination of
statutes of limitations represent poor public policy).
29. SeeLoRNET.KIRBYDNANGERPROnG1 (1992)(definingDNAproftling). Terms
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of identical twins, every human has a unique hereditary composition.3" To
determine an individual's genetic makeup, experts can extract DNA from
many sources, including hair bulbs, blood, and semen." An individual's DNA
is identical regardless of its source."2 These principles provide the basis for
DNA profiling, 3 and governmental authorities have noted that these scientific
principles and techniques are "universally accepted."34
While the technology used to create DNA profiles is complex and replete
with scientific jargon, a rudimentary understanding will help in discussing the
legal, social, and political aspects of this novel use of DNA profiling. The
following summary is not meant to thoroughly explore all the intricacies of
the science behind DNA profiling.35 Instead, it is intended merely to serve as
a roadmap for further discussion of the subject.
DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is the genetic material present in the
nucleus of cells of all living organisms. 6 Because DNA contains all of the
information required to make an organism grow and develop, commentators
have called it the "blueprint of life. '37 DNA is responsible for defining an
individual; it encodes all of the information that gives each human his or her
related to "DNA profiling" include DNA identification analysis, identity testing, fingerprinting,
typing, and genotyping. Id.
30. Id.; see also COMMISSION ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCEET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DNA TECHmOLOGY iN FORENSIc SCIENCE 3 (1992) [hereinafter DOJ I]
(noting that, except for identical twins, DNA of person is unique for practical purposes);
Commiss oN ON DNA FoRENsic ScIENcE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THm EVALUAION
OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 9-10 (1996) [hereinafter DOJ III (noting that probability of
two different persons sharing same DNA is "vanishingly small" and soon may be proven to be
zero).
31. KIRBY, supra note 29, at 1; see also DOJ II, supra note 11, at 21-22 (noting potential
sources for DNA samples including blood, saliva, semen, or hair); Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA
Matches and Statistics: Important Questions, Surprising Answers, 76 JUDICATURE 222-23
(1993) (noting that typical DNA identification compares DNA from blood, semen, or hairs left
at crime scene with samples taken from suspect).
32. KIRBY, supra note 29, at 1.
33. See id. (noting that individual uniqueness and identical DNA structure within all
tissues of the same body provide basis for DNA profiling); see also DO III, supra note 11, at
21 (noting that DNA is same throughout body).
34. See DOJII,supra note 30, at 9 ("DNAtyping . .. is based on a large body of scientific
principles and techniques that are universally accepted.").
35. See generally DOJ 111 supra note 11, at 21-30 (providing more detailed description
of DNA technology); DOJ , supra note 30, at 60-165 (detailing scientific principles of DNA
technology); KIRBY, supra note 29, at 7-176 (detailing DNA identification).
36. DOJ HI, supra note 11, at 21; see also Warren . Webster, Jr., DNA Database Sta-
tutes &Privacy in theInformationAge, 10 HEALTH MATIX 119,122 (2000) ("DNA molecule
is found in all cells which have a nucleus.").
37. DOJ I, supra note 11, at 21; see also Koehler, supra note 31, at 223 (noting that
DNA "contains the genetic code that provides the blueprint for life").
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physical characteristics.38 While the majority of DNA is the same from one
human to another, some locations in DNA differ from individual to individ-
ual23 The DNA molecule contains two strands, or chains, twisted to form a
double-helixm" Each strand consists of a string of bases: adenine, thymine,
guanine, and cytosine.41 These bases line up in pairs - an adenine opposite a
thymine and a guanine opposite a cytosine.42 A gene is a stretch of DNA, and
the position that a gene occupies along a DNA strand is the gene's locus.
4 3
DNA profiling focuses on the stretches of DNA that are highly variable among
individuals; segments that academics call polymorphic sites or loci." These
varying locations on DNA are the ones that DNA profiling analyzes to compare
the DNA from an unknown evidence sample to the DNA collected from a
known individual.45 Because DNA is present in all cells with a nucleus and is
uniform throughout the body, nearly any fluid or tissue from a human contains
at least some DNA that profiling can analyze.4 Additionally, DNA is not
subject to change over time; therefore, the relative age of samples is largely
irrelevant when comparing them for identification purposes.47
Although several DNA tests exist,48 all the tests perform many standard
steps. The following steps are part of the general procedure:
38. See DOJ Il, supra note 11, at 21 (noting that DNA gives humans their physical
characteristics and "allows [them] to function and be recognized as human").
39. See id. (noting exception to this general proposition for identical twins); Webster,
supra note 36, at 122 (noting that ninety-nine percent of approximately three billion base pairs
are same among humans).
40. See DOJ I, supra note 30, at 12 (describing double-helix shape of DNA molecule).
41. Id.
42. i at 13.
43. Id; see also Webster, supra note 36, at 122 ("Genes... are specific sequences of
nucleotides at certain chromosomal locations called loci.").
44. See Webster, supra note 36, at 122 (noting highly variable segments on DNA called
polymorphic sites or loci).
45. DOJ III, supra note 11, at 21; see also Webster, supra note 36, at 122 (noting that
over ninety-nine percent of base pairs are same among humans and that DNA profiling focuses
on approximately three million base pairs that vary).
46. DOJIllsupra note 11, at21.
47. See id. (noting that one can compare samples collected in past with more recent sam-
ples). Samples collected from a crime scene can come from common sources such as blood,
saliva, hair, or semen. Id. at 21-22. When these conventional samples are not available, other
possible sources include clothing in close contact with the body, bedding, and cigarette butts,
to name a few. Id. at 22. Samples obtained from known individuals are usually either blood,
hair, or oral swabs. Id.
48. See id. at 26-28 (discussing different DNA tests). Rapid improvement in DNA tech-
nology has resulted in greater ability to obtain reliable results and increased "discriminatory
capabilities." Id. at xiv. Initially, crime labs used restriction fragment length polymorphism
(RFLP) testing. Id. at xiv-xv. This test is very accurate, but it requires a large amount of good
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1) the isolation of the DNA from an evidence sample containing DNA of
unknown origin and, generally at a later time, the isolation of DNA from
a sample (e.g., blood) from a known individual; 2) the processing of the
DNA so thattest results maybe obtained; 3) the determination ofthe DNA
test results (or types), from specific regions of the DNA; and 4) the com-
parison and interpretation ofthe test results from the unknown and known
samples to determine whetherthe known individual is excluded as (is not)
the source of the DNA or is included as a possible source of the DNA.49
DNA tests yield three possible results: exclusions, inclusions, or inconclusive
results.'O Each additional test at a previously untested location in the DNA
provides another opportunity for an "exclusion" result ifthe known individual
in the comparison is nottthe source of the DNA fronthe unknown individual's
evidence sample."1 Alternatively, if the known individual is the source of the
DNA from the evidence sample, subsequent tests will continue to "include"
that known individual as a possible source of the DNA.52 When a large number
of performed tests do not exclude the known individual as the source, the odds
that the known individual is not the source ofthe unknown DNA are extremely
small, and the tests have statistically shown that the known individual is the
source of the DNA. 3 Inconclusive results are those that are not probative of
identification, typically because of a limited amount of DNA in the evidence
sample or a lack of known individuals for comparison.'
B. Forensic Use of DNA in Courts
Due to the cutting-edge nature of DNA evidence when courts began to
use it, many of the early cases involving DNA evidence provided an overview
as to how the courts would rule on its admissibility."5 One of the first uses of
quality DNA (approximately 100,000 or more cells). Id. Most crime labs now use a more
modem test based on the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method. Id. This test uses a molec-
ular copying technique that produces reliable data from "extremely small amounts of DNA in
crime scene samples" (approximately 50 to 100 cells). Id; see also Webster, supra note 36, at
123 (discussing various available genetic tests).
49. DOJHI, supranote ll, at21.
50. Id. at 28-29.
51. Id. at21.
52. Id.
53. See id. ("When a sufficient number of tests have been performed in which an individ-
ual cannot be excluded as the source of the DNA by any of the tests, a point is reached at which
the tests have excluded virtually the world's population and the unique identification of that
individual as the source of the DNA has been achieved."). "The term 'match' is also commonly
used when the test results are consistent with the results from a known individual." Id. at 28.
54. Id. at 29.
55. See infra notes 56-74 and accompanying text (discussing early cases involving
admissibility of DNA evidence).
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DNA in a criminal case in the United States occurred in Orange County,
Florida.56 The trial court convicted the defendant, Tommy Lee Andrews, of
rape after DNA tests matched his DNA with the DNA collected from semen
traces on a rape victim.. In upholding the conviction, the intermediate appel-
late court noted that "evidence derived from DNA print identification appears
based on proven scientific principles..... After this initial use of DNA evi-
dence, a series of state court cases set various precedents regarding the use of
DNA technology. 59
In State v. Woodall,"o the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
became the first state high court to rule on the admissibility of DNA evi-
dence.61 After unsuccessfully raising the issue before trial, the defendant
finally convinced the trial court to accept his DNA testing post-trial; however,
inconclusive results failed to eliminate Woodall as the perpetrator.62 Woodall
appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
setting the stage for the first ruling on DNA admissibility in any state's high
court. 3 Although it ruled that DNA evidence is generally admissible, the
court upheld Woodall's conviction." However, authorities eventually re-
56. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that no
other appellate case had addressed DNA identification admissibility in criminal case).
57. Id. at 843.
58. Id. at 850.
59. See infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (discussing early state court cases
outside Florida involving DNA evidence).
60. 385 S.E.d 253 (W. Va. 1989).
61. See State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253,260 (W. Va. 1989) (holding in part thatrelevant
scientific community generally accepted scientific techniques of DNA typing analysis). In
Woodall, the court addressed the issue of the admissibility of DNA print analysis tests. Id. at
259. Prosecutors charged the defendant, Glen Dale Woodall, with various crimes arising from
two attacks on two separate women. Id. at 256-58. At trial, the evidence against the defendant
included, among other things, blood analysis of his blood compared to semen samples recovered
from the victims. Id. at 258. On his behalf, the defendant offered alibi-testimony as well as his
own testimony. Id at 259. Additionally, he sought to have the trial court order a then new blood
test known as DNA print analysis. Id. The trial court refused to order the test and convicted the
defendant on all charges. Id. The defense raised this issue again after the trial, and a lab even-
tually performed a DNA test Id. However, the test proved inconclusive. Id. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted that Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923), established the traditional test for admitting results of novel scientific techniques.
Woodall, 385 S.E.2d at 259. The court found that the relevant scientific fields generally accepted
DNA typing analysis, thereby satisfying the Frye test Id. at 260. The court went on to hold,
however, that DNA tests are not always admissible, particularly when a party offers expert
testimony to impeach the reliability of the procedures used or the results obtained. Id.
62. Id. at 259.
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leased Woodall from prison after subsequent DNA testing demonstrated his
innocence.
65
In another first in the use of DNA, prosecutors in Virginia used DNA
evidence in a series of murder cases to obtain a guilty verdict resulting in a
death sentence.' In Spencer v. Commonwealth,67 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia upheld Spencer's murder and rape convictions that the lower court had
based on DNA testing that matched his DNA with DNA from semen found in
several victims.' Despite the defense's efforts to convince the court to
exclude the DNA evidence, the court ruled that it was admissible, primarily
because no expert testimony challenged the general acceptance of the reliabil-
ity of DNA testing within the scientific community. 9 Spencer became the
65. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CONVICTEDBY JURIES, EXON-
ERATEDBYSCiENcE: CAsE STUDIES IN THE USE OFDNAEiDENCB.TOESTABUSHINNOCENCE
AYTER TRIAL 5 (noting Woodall's release from prison after DNA test proved his innocence).
After the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals aflirmed his conviction, Woodall continued
to file motions to allow DNA testing of the evidence. Id. at 75. The court finally released the
evidence to the defense for additional DNA testing. Id. The forensic laboratory that conducted
the tests concluded that the DNA from the crime scene did not match Woodall's DNA. Id. The
court subsequently vacated his conviction and dismissed the indictment against him. Id. at 75-
76. It is important to note that the police chemist who testified for the state was investigated for
providing perjured testimony in this and other cases. Id. at 76. As a general proposition, it is
also important to recognize that technological advances in DNA evidence that occurred during
the 1990s now make it possible to obtain conclusive results for situations in which previous
testing was inconclusive. DOJ II, supra note 11, at 2. Thus, "postonviction testing will be
requested not only in cases in which DNA testing was never done, but also in cases in which a
newer, more sensitive technology may now be able to furnish a conclusive answer." Id.
66. See CONNORS ET AL, supra note 65, at 5 (noting that DNA evidence led to capital
sentences).
67. 384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989).
68. See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 783, 785 (Va. 1989) (affirming
defendant's capital sentence partly based on DNA evidence). In Spencer, the Supreme Court of
Virginia addressed the admissibility of DNA print identification. Id. at 781. A grand jury
indicted Timothy Wilson Spencer for the rape and murder of Susan Tucker. Id. at 776. At trial,
the prosecution presented a DNA printing test establishing that the genetic material in Spencer's
blood sample matched the genetic material in semen stains found at the crime scene. Id. at 777.
The defendant appealed his conviction, in part claiming that the trial court erred in admitting the
DNA evidence. Id. at 781. The Spencer court outlined the general scientific principles under-
lying DNA print identification. Id. at 781-82. The court noted the undisputed expert testimony
that DNA printing is a reliable scientific technique and that the lab conducted the procedures
used in the present case in a reliable manner. Id. at 782-83. Also, the court pointed out that the
defendant did not dispute the prosecution's evidence with expert testimony. Id. at 783. Instead,
the defense merely urged the court to "'hold offuntil another day any decision that DNA printing
is acceptable evidence in the courts of Virginin.'" Id. (quoting defendant Spencer's counsel).
Because the court found that DNA testing is a reliable scientific technique and that the labs
properly performed the tests done in the present case, the court held that the DNA evidence was
admissible. Id.
69. Id. at 783.
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first person in the United States to be executed on the basis of DNA evidence
when he was put to death on April 27, 1994.20
While the Spencer court's decision to allow the DNA evidence did not
require an exhaustive inquiry, more serious challenges to DNA evidence were
bound to arise. In the first case that elicited a significant defense challenge
to the admissibility of DNA evidence, New York's supreme court undertook
a searching review in resolving the issue.' In People v. Castro,72 the court
conducted a 12-week pretrial hearing to examine various issues regarding the
admissibility of such evidence." Undoubtedly as a result ofthe court's ruling
on the pretrial hearing, Castro pleaded guilty and never went to trial.74
After its initial admittance under the various federal and state standards,
including the "general acceptance" test, DNA evidence is now subject to
70. See CoNNoRS ET AL., supra note 65, at 74 (noting that Spencer was first person
executed in United States based on DNA testing).
71. See id at 5 (noting that People v. Castro was first case to seriously challenge admis-
sibility of DNA evidence).
72. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
73. See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (concluding that DNA
identification is generally accepted within scientific community and that pretrial hearings are
required to determine whether testing laboratory's methodology meets with scientific standards
and produces reliable results). At a pretrial hearing in Castro, the court addressed the issue of
the admissibility of DNA identification tests. Id. at 985. The court itself noted that it had
undertaken "the most comprehensive and extensive legal examination of DNA forensic identi-
fication tests held to date in the United States." Id. As part of its case against the defendant,
who was charged with two counts of murder, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of
DNA identification tests. Id. at 985-86. Initially, the court recognized that New York followed
the general acceptance test set forth inFrye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), in
determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 986. To
aid in the admissibility determination, the court advanced a three prong analysis:
Prong I. Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the scientific community,
which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable
results?
Prong f. Are there techniques or experiments that are capable of producing relia-
ble results in DNA identification and which are generally accepted in the scientific
community?
Prong Il Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scientific techniques in
analyzing the forensic samples in this particular case?
Id. at 987. The court noted that in this case, the first two prongs dealt with the Frye test, while
the third prong was the subject of the pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the particular DNA
evidence presented in the case. Id. at 988. Invoking this analysis, the court concluded that
DNA identification is generally accepted within the scientific community and that pretrial
hearings are required to determine whether the testing laboratory's methodology meets scientific
standards and produces reliable results. Id. at 999. Addressing a key issue related to the use
of DNA evidence, the court recommended numerous discovery procedures to ensure that the
admissibility inquiry could be conducted properly. Id.
74. See CoNNORS Er AL., supra note 65, at 9 (noting that Castro pleaded guilty and was
never tried).
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another standard articulated in a 1993 Supreme Court decision."1 Prior to the
1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," expert
scientific testimony was admissible if it had gained "general acceptance" in
the relevant scientific community." In the Daubert decision, the Supreme
Court concluded that the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rules), not the "general
acceptance" test, provide the standard for admitting expert scientific testi-
mony-8 The Court noted that the Rules, specifically Rule 702, make no
mention of a "general acceptance" requirement and are designed generally to
allow more, not less, opinion testimony.7 9 However, while the Rules do take
a liberal approach in allowing the inclusion of expert testimony, the trial judge
is not barred from screening expert scientific testimony." In fact, the Rules
require the trial judge to serve as a gatekeeper whose role is to ensure that all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is both relevant and reliable.81 A
75. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text (discussing Daubert case).
76. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
77. See Daubert v. Merrell DowPharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,585 (1993) (recognizingthat
"general acceptance" test from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,1014 (1923), had been pri-
mary standard for determining admissibility of scientific evidence). In Daubert, the Supreme
Court considered the appropriate standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal
trial. Id. at 582. Daubert and Schuller, minor children, and their parents (Daubert) sued Menell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Co. (Dow), alleging that Bendeclin, a prescription drug marketed by Dow,
had caused birth defects in the children. Id. After exhaustive discovery, Dow moved for
summaryjudgment, relying on an expert's conclusion that use ofBendectin had not been shown
to cause human birth defects. Id. Daubertresponded to Dow's motion with testimony from eight
experts who concluded that Bendectin could cause birth defects. Id. at 583. In affirming the
district court's decision to grant the motion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated that expert scientific testimony is admissible if the underlying methodology is
"generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific community. a at 584 (quoting Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013,1014 (1923)). The Daubert Court concluded that the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded the "general acceptance" test Id. at 587. The
Court reasoned that the strict "general acceptance" requirement was incompatible with the liberal
nature of the Rules. Id at 588. The Court noted that the Rules, particularly Rule 702, provide
the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony and oblige the trial judge to ensure that
such testimony is both relevant and reliable. Id at 589. The condition in Rule 702 that requires
that an expert's opinion pertain to "scientific knowledge" establishes the reliability standard, and
the condition that the testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue" establishes the relevance standard. Id. at 589-91. The Daubert Court suggested
four factors to be considered by the trial judge in determining whether or not the proffered expert
scientific testimony meets the Rule 702 standard. Id. at 592-94. The four factors are testing, peer
review, error rates, and acceptability in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94; see
generally SymposiumAt the Daubert Gate: Managing and MeasuringExpertise in anAge of
Science, Specialization, and Speculation, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661 (2000) (discussing
Daubert's impact on expert testimony).
78. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
79. Id. at 588.
80. Id. at 589.
81. Id.; see id. at 597 (recognizing gatekeeping role).
1597
58 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1585 (2001)
determination of relevance and reliability of the expert scientific testimony
requires the trial judge to assess whether the reasoning supporting the testi-
mony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning is applicable to the
particular facts at issue. 2 Four helpful, though not dispositive, factors that
trial judges may use in making the assessment of relevance and reliability are
testing, peer review and publication, known rates of error, and widespread
acceptance. 3 In addition to noting the importance of Rule 702 in evaluating
the admissibility of expert scientific testimony, the Court also admonished
trial judges to be alert to other applicable rules, specifically Rule 403.)
Daubert is binding only in federal courts; however, it has been influential in
states that have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.85 Although many
states follow Daubert, it has not had the effect of limiting the admissibility of
DNA evidence, and all jurisdictions now admit such evidence under Frye,
Daubert, a relevance-helpfulness standard, or a statutory standard. 6
After passing many rounds of judicial screening, DNA technology has
overcome its novel roots in the world of evidence to become a pervasive
element in our criminal justice system. In fact; DNA evidence has been ruled
admissible in all United States jurisdictions.' However, its ever-increasing
use by prosecutors has raised the defense bar's awareness to DNA evidence,
and, consequently, it is now often subject to more vigorous attacks by defen-
dants.88 While DNA technology is now regularly used in the United States
judicial system, 9 it is not beyond reproach, and many defense attorneys are
82. Id. at 592-93.
83. Id. at 592-94.
84. Id. at 595; see FED. R. EvID. 403 (providing standard for exclusion of relevant
evidence). Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." Id.
85. See Webster, supra note 36, at 124 (noting that Daubert "is influential in state courts,
especially those that have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence").
86. See DOJ 11, supra note 30, at 205-11 (listing various standards for admitting DNA
evidence in different jurisdictions).
87. See DOJ II, supra note 11, at 1 (noting that DNA evidence is now admitted in all
jurisdictions).
88. See Koehler, supra note 31, at 222 (noting increased awareness of potential error in
DNA analysis). While the initial decisions regarding DNA evidence forced courts to rule on
its admissibility due to its fledgling scientific status, these courts were inclined to accept DNA
profiling as a nearly foolproof means of identifying a suspect who left behind genetic material
at a crime scene - some courts were even described as being "in awe of the evidence." Id.
However, there is now an increased awareness that DNA tests have the potential for error and
are deserving of special scrutiny. Id.
89. See CONNORS ET AL.., supra note 65, at 4 (noting use of DNA technology by police,
prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts).
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becoming quasi-experts on the subject in order to mount effective defenses."
Therefore, this new law enforcement tactic is not likely to catch the defense
bar totally by surprise, although there are other issues regarding DNA war-
rants and indictments that to date have not been addressed. 9
HI Warrant and Indictment Requirements
A. Federal and State Code Provisions Regarding Suspect Identification
in Arrest Warrants or Indictments
Law enforcement officials have used this DNA identification method to
obtain either arrest warrants or indictments against otherwise unidentified
suspects.' Regardless of the form in which this tactic is employed, the
purpose of tolling the applicable statute of limitations is the same.93 To date,
90. See Koehler, supra note 31, at 222 (noting defense attomeys' concerns over details of
DNA identification process).
Defendants have challenged the admissibility of DNA results on the grounds that the
protocols or procedures followed by the laboratory were inadequate to reduce the
risk of error sufficiently, that the laboratory failed to adhere to the stated protocols,
or that the laboratory failed to demonstrate its ability to type samples accurately on
a series of external, blind proficiency tests.
DOJ Il, supra note 30, at 179. However, courts have generally not been inclined to exclude
DNA evidence on these grounds. Id. Instead, most courts treat the possibility of laboratory error
as affecting the weight rather than the admissibility of DNA evidence. Id. at 179-80. Another
concern that has, however, given courts "pause in admitting DNA evidence involves the methods
for characterizing the implications of an observed degree of similarity in DNA types." Id. at 185.
The scientific controversy over the proper method for determining the frequency of a given DNA
profile is at the core of this defense objection. Id. Defense attorneys are not the only ones who
might challenge the admissibility or relevance of DNA testing. Prosecutors might wish to ex-
clude DNA testing, particularly in cases where a prosecutor has secured a conviction and the
defendant requests postconviction DNA testing. See DOJ I, supra note 11, at 31-41 (providing
recommendations to prosecutors faced with requests for postconviction DNA testing). One
potential argument for prosecutors is that additional testing will not be helpful to the defendant's
claim of innocence and therefore is irrelevant See id. at 35 (noting opposition to defendant's
request for postconviction testing when results would be of questionable significance, when
favorable results would not be meaningful, when testing is not possible, or when testing would
be frivolous). There are some cases, however, when prosecutors should not oppose a defendant's
request for DNA analysis. See id. at 40 ("For example, when a rape case turned solely, or in large
part, on eyewitness testimony, where serology at the time was inconclusive or not highly dis-
criminating, and newer, more discriminating tests are now available, the prosecutor should order
DNAtesting.").
91. See infra Parts IID, ILE, IV.C (discussing whether or not DNA warrants and indict-
ments meet identification standard; notice function of warrants and indictments; and their rela-
tion to existing statutes of limitations).
92. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (listing various jurisdictions that have used
DNA profiling tactic to procure arrest warrants or indictments).
93. See supra notes 6, 10, 13 and accompanying text (discussing use of DNA warrants
and indictments to circumvent statutes of limitations).
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this DNA profiling tactic has not been used in a federal case, but state offi-
cials employing this tactic have used it to obtain arrest warrants or indict-
ments, depending on what is required to commence a criminal prosecution and
to toll the statute of limitations according to state law. 94 In other words, when
state law provides that a criminal prosecution commences upon the issuance
of an arrest warrant, prosecutors have proceeded in that manner, but when an
indictment is required, they obtain that instead.9' Either way, the prosecu-
tion's position is that the statute of limitations clock stops running because the
criminal prosecution has commenced.96 The important issue is whether or not
the description of the individual is sufficient to create a valid arrest warrant
or indictment.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
warrants must particularly describe the person to be seized.' Rule 4(c)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an arrest warrant con-
tain "the name of the defendant, or if the defendant's name is unknown, any
name or description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable
94. In jurisdictions where DNA warrants have been used, an arrest warrant tolls the appli-
cable statute of limitations. For example, in California, where a DNA arrest warrant has been
used to toll the statute of limitations, the law provides that the prosecuting of an offense has
commenced, thereby tolling the statute of limitations, when, inter alia, an indictment or informa-
tion is filed or an arrest warrant is issued, provided the warrant names or describes the defendant
with the same degree ofparticularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint CAL.
PENAL CODE § 804 (West 1985 & Supp.2001). InNewYorkwhereDNAindictmentshave been
used, the law provides that a criminal action is commenced with the filing of an accusatory
instrument, which includes an indictment N.Y. CRM. PRoc. LAW § 100.05 (McKinney 1992).
The decision to proceed by warrant or indictment in other states has probably been influenced by
similar provisions. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2-104 (1997) (stating that prosecution is
commenced, inter alia, by finding indictment or presentment or issuing of warrant); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 12.05(b) (Vernon 1977) ("The time during the pendency of an indictment,
information, or complaint shall not be computed in the period of limitation."); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 968.02(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (providing that arrest warrant shall issue after complaint
has been issued and filed, and that such filing commences criminal prosecution).
95. When state law provides that aprosecution has commenced by issuing an arrest warrant
or obtaining an indictment, prosecutors can proceed in either manner and still toll the statute of
limitations. For example, Texas prosecutors employing this tactic have chosen to proceed by
indictment See TEX. CRiM. PROc. CODEANN. § 12.05(b) (Vernon 1977) ("The time during the
pendency of an indictment, information, or complaint shall not be computed in the period of
limitation."); Timms, supra note 13, at IA (noting Dallas prosecutor's use of DNA indictment).
Wisconsin's Norman (3ahn, having the option of tolling the statute of limitations with an indict-
ment, instead chose to obtain an arrest warrant upon the filing ofa criminal complaint, which also
tolls the limitations period. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 967.05, 968.02(2) (West 1998 & Supp.
2000) (providing that filing of indictment or criminal complaint commences prosecution and that
upon filing of criminal complaint, arrest warrant shall issue); Doege, supra note 6, at I (noting
that issuance of arrestwarrant occurred upon Gahn's filing of criminal complaint).
96. See supra notes 6, 10, 13 and accompanying text (discussing use of DNA warrants
and indictments to circumvent statutes of limitations).
97. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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certainty. ''9 Nearly all other jurisdictions have identical or analogous pro-
visions.' In jurisdictions where DNA indictments have been used, the de-
scription requirements for defendants are essentially the same as they are for
arrest warrants; °° however, in New York, the statute does not explicitly pro-
vide for means of identification other than the defendant's name. °" Similar
to New York, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require that the
defendant be correctly named, or even otherwise described, in the indict-
98. FED. R. CIUM. P. 4(cXl).
99. See, e.g., CAL. PENALCODE § 804(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 2001) (providing thatprose-
cution for offense has commenced when "[ajn arrest warrant ... is issued, provided the warrant
names or describes the defendant with the same degree of particularity required for an indict-
ment, information, or complaint"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 959(4) (West 1985) (providing that
accusatory pleading is sufficient if "the defendant is named, or if his name is unknown, that he
is described by a fictitious name, with a statement that his true name is to the grand jury, district
attorney, or complainant, as the casemay be, unknown"); D.C. CoDEANN. § 23-561(bXl) (1981)
("An arrest warrant shall... ontain. .. the name of the person to be arrested or, if his name is
unknown, any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty.");
725 ILL. COMp. STAT.ANN. 5/107-9(dX2) (West 1992) ("The warrant ofarrest shall... [s]pecify
the name, sex and birth date of the person to be arrested or if his name, sex or birth date is
unknown, shal designate such person by any name or description by which he can be iaentified
with reasonable certainty."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-214(1Xd) (1999) ("An arrest warrant
must specify the name of the person to be arrested or, if that person's name is unknown, desig-
nate the person by any name or description by which the person can be identified with reasonable
certainty."); N.Y. CRBC PRoc. LAW § 120.10(2) (McKinney 1992)("Awarrant ofarrestmust...
state or contain... the name of the defendant to be arrested or, if such be unknown, any name
or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-2-4 (Michie 1998) ("Each arrest warrant shall. . . contain the name of the defendant, or
if his name is unknown, any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable
certainty."); TEMN. R. CRIM P. 4(cX1) ("The arrest warrant shall... contain the name of the
defendant or, if the name is unknown, any name or description by which the defendant can be
identified with reasonable certainty."); TEx. CRiM. PROc. CODEANN. § 15.02(1) (Vernon 1977)
(stating that arrest warrant "must specify the name of the person whose arrest is ordered, if it be
known, if unknown, then some reasonably definite description must be given ofhim"); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-72 (Michie 2000) ("The warrant shal... name the accused or, if his name is
unknown, set forth a description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty."); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 968.04(3) (West 1998) ("The warrant shall ... [s]tate the name of the person to
be arrested, if known, or if not known, designate the person to be arrested by any description by
which the person to be arrested can be identified with reasonable certainty.").
100. See, e.g., Mo. R. CRlM. P. 23.01(bXl) (requiring that indictment"[s]tate the name of
the defendant if known, or if his name is not known, the defendant may be designated by any
name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty"); NML R. CRIM.
P. 5-202(C) (requiring that any pleading, including indictment, state name of defendant, and if
defendant's name is not known, "he may be described by any name or description by which he
can be identified with reasonable certainty"); TEX. CR PRoc. CODEANN. § 21.02(4) (Vernon
1989) (requiring that indictment "contain the name of the accused, or state that his name is
unknown and give a reasonably accurate description of him").
101. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 200.50 (MeKinney 1992) (providing form and content
of indictment and not calling for any particular description, but merely referring to "the
defendant").
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ment. °a Thus, in most cases, the sufficiency of description analysis will be
essentially the same for arrest warrants and indictments. However, a different
issue stems from the fact that indictments have long been held to serve several
important purposes, one of which is to put the defendant on notice of charges
pending against him," which arguably is something that DNA indictments do
not accomplish.
DNA warrants or indictments do not contain the name of the defendant,
but law enforcement officials who use them believe that a DNA profile meets
the description requirements. ° They argue that DNA goes well beyond a
reasonable certainty and in fact conclusively pinpoints only one individual."05
Defendants contend that identification reqiirements mandate more traditional
methods of physical description, such as a description of the suspect's physi-
cal characteristics. 1" The use of a DNA profile as a description was certainly
not contemplated by the drafters of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and the makers of the federal and state laws were proba-
bly not aware of such a possibility when enacting the current warrant and
indictment requirements.' ° Courts have not yet thoroughly evaluated this
type of description; however, they have addressed the issue of the sufficiency
of other types of descriptions in the past.
102. See FED. R. CRM. P. 7(cXl) (providing that "indictment.. . shall be a plain, concise
and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged" and refer-
ring only to "the defendant" with no further instruction as to description).
103. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying tex (discussing purposes of indictments).
104. See Bill Dedman, Indictent Seeks Rapist Identified Only by DNA, AusTIN Mi-
STATESMAN, Oct 7, 1999, at A6 (stating that DNA identification satisfies reasonable certainty
standard); Slater, supra'note 11, at Al (noting prosecutor's comment that "[w]e know exactly
who these rapists are, [but] [w]e just don't know their names"); Editorial, To Ensure Justice,
Allow DNA Evidence in Novel Ways, VIRGINAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), Jan. 16,
2001, at B10 (stating that DNA is at least as effective indicator of identity as man's name or
fingerprint); UsefulPolice Tool Goes to Waste, USA TODAY, Nov. 1,1999, at 28A (stating that
traditional identification has included aliases, addresses, and physical descriptions, and arguing
that these methods are no more certain or specific than DNA).
105. See infra note 146 and accompanying text (noting Norman Gahn's view on DNA
identification).
106. See Cooper, supra note 13, at A3 (discussing California case of first defendant arrested
on DNA warrant). Paul Eugene Robinson was the first defendant arrested on a DNA arrest
warrant, and his attorney initially indicated that he would ask that the case be dismissed on the
ground that his client was not named in the warrant Id. Subsequently, the judge indicated that
the warrant may have been invalid because the entire DNA profile was not on the warrant;
therefore, the case against Robinson could have been dismissed on a technicality. Hallissy,
DATA Arrest May Be Tossed, supra note 19, at A8. However, after a hearing, the judge upheld
the warrant Hallissy, Judge Upholds Use ofDNA Warrants, supra note 19, at Al.
107. See Hoffman, supra note 13, at Al (noting Milwaukee prosecutor Norman Gahn's
admission that lawmakers probably did not envision use of DNA profiles as descriptions when
they drafted arrest warrant law requiring reasonably certain description).
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B. Courts'Decisions Regarding Sufficiency ofDescription in Arrest Warrant
In West v. Cabell,cu the Supreme Court ofthe United States dealt with the
issue of the validity of an arrest warrant that incorrectly named the arrestee.'"
The plaintiff alleged that he was unlawfully arrested upon a warrant that named
the suspect as James West.10 However, the plaintiffs name was Vandy M.
West, and he had never been known by any other name."' The defendants
claimed that, although the wrong name appeared in the warrant, the plaintiff
was the man for whom the arrest warrant was intended."' The Court noted
that, at common law, an arrest warrant must correctly name the person charged
with the crime or describe him in a manner sufficient to identify him."3 In
addition, the Court recognized that both the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Texas Constitution require particular descriptions
of persons to be seized." 4 Thus, the Court concluded that the private intention
of the warrant issuer was an insufficient proxy for the constitutionally required
particular description." 5 The Court held that the warrant for the arrest of
James West, without other description of the person intended, was not valid to
arrest a person named Vandy M. West."6
Since this early case involving the validity of arrest warrants, other courts
have expounded on what constitutes a sufficient description of a suspect.'
7
108. 153 U.S. 78 (1894).
109. West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 78-79 (1894). In West, the Supreme Court considered
the validity of an arrest warrant that incorrectly named the suspect and provided no other de-
scription of him. Id. Vandy M. West was arrested upon a warrant that named the suspect as
"James West." Id. at 78. The defendants claimed that although the arrest warrant incorrectly
named the plaintiff, it was nevertheless intended for the arrest of Vandy M. West. IM at 79-80.
The Court first noted that, at common law, "a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with
crime must truly name him, or describe him sufficiently to identify him." Id. at 85. The Court
also pointed out that the United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, and the applicable
state statutes require arrest warrants to contain the suspect's name or some other particular de-
scription of him. Id. at 87. The Court held that "the private intention of the magistrate was [an
insufficient] substitute for the constitutional requirement of a particular description in the war-
rant" Id. at 88. Therefore, the warrant was held invalid. Id.
110. Id. at79.
111. Id. at78.





117. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963) (stating that
Fourth Amendment requirement that person or thing to be seized be particularly described
applies to both arrest and search warrants); United States v. Doe, 703 F.2d 745,747-48 (3d Cir.
1983) (stating that arrest warrant describing its subject only as "John Doe a/k/a Ed" was con-
stitutionally insufficient and that law enforcement officer's independent personal knowledge
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However, none of these cases have dealt specifically with the legality of"John
Doe" arrest warrants containing DNA profiles as descriptions of suspects.
Nonetheless, several general propositions can be gleaned from these decisions.
First, courts have widely recognized that the Fourth Amendment requires a
particularized description of the person to be seized.11 The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and many analogous state law provisions comply with this
requirement by requiring a warrant to name the individual, or, alternatively, to
provide a description by which the individual can be reasonably identified." 9
Second, "John Doe" warrants with no particularizing information do not satisfy
the Fourth Amendment requirement.120 Finally, if a party wishes to obtain an
arrest warrant without the name of the suspect, the warrant must contain a
description that sufficiently describes the suspect in order for such a warrant
to be valid."2 These general propositions then lead to the question: Do "John
Doe" warrants ever contain sufficient information to describe the suspect so
that he can be identified with reasonable certainty?
Absent some type of particularizing description, "John Doe" warrants
regularly have been held invalid." However, these warrants are not always
void.'23 A "John Doe" warrant is not invalid simply because it does not
that defendant was person for whom warrant was intended did not cure that insufficiency); Powe
v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639,645 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that arrestwarrantthat incorrectly
names defendant must have some other description of defendant); United States v. Arnold, 403
F. Supp. 172, 175 (ED. Penn. 1975) (stating that FED. R. CR2M. P. 4 and Fourth Amendment
require warrant to contain any name or description by which defendant can be identified with
reasonable certainty when name of defendant is unknown); United States v. Swanner, 237 F.
Supp. 69,71 (E.D. Tenn. 1964) (stating that use of "John Doe" warrant may be permissible only
with some further description of person intended to be designated by warrant); People v.
Montoya, 63 Cal. Rptr. 73, 77-78 (Cal. Ct App. 1967) (holding "John Doe" arrest warrant void
when it described defendant as "white male adult, 30 to 35 years, 5' 10", 175 lbs., dark hair,
medium build"); McIntyre v. State, 530 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (stating that
arrest warrant identifying suspect as "John Doe -white male slim build - approx. 17-18 years
old" was insufficient because description was too vague and indistinct); Winters v. Campbell,
137 S.E.2d 188, 192 (W. Va. 1964) (stating that warrant for arrest of"John Doe" is void if it
does not contain sufficient description of person to be arrested).
118. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing one court's recognition
of constitutionally required particular description).
119. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing federal rule and state
statutes that require particularized description of defendant in arrest warrant).
120. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (discussing one court's rejection of
"John Doe" warrants with no particularizing information).
121. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text (discussing courts' interpretations as
to what constitutes sufficient description in arrest warrant).
122. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting invalidity of "John Doe" warrants
without further description).
123. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (describing what courts have indicated
as sufficient descriptive information).
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contain the name of the defendant - such a warrant will suffice if it contains
sufficient information to identify the personto be arrested.'24 This identifying
information can be the defendant's occupation, place of residence, physical
appearance, or other specific ident&ying information." s However, courts
imply that there is no all-inclusive list of identification methods and that deter-mining what constitutes sufficient identifying information is a contextual
exercise.1 6 Though courts often note the need for particularizing information
in "John Doe" arrest warrants, 27 there is little authority on the subject ofwhich
specific methods of identification will suffice in arrest warrants.'2 However,
"a useful analogy is presented by the cases relating to search warrants."'29
Some courts have said that "John Doe" search warrants are valid when they
contain sufficient information regarding the person to be searched. 30 Other
courts, however, often have found apparently similar descriptive information
to be insufficient to create a valid search warrant.' 3 ' Despite the divergent
results in these cases, the underlying rationale of the courts appears to be the
same: in order to be valid, a "John Doe" warrant must reach a certain thresh-
old level of particularity, with this threshold to be determined according to the
124. See Blocker v. Clark, 54 S.E. 1022,1023 (Ga. 1906) (notingthat "John Doe" warrant
can be valid with identifying information).
125. Id. While this court listed "personal appearance" as an acceptable means of identifica-
tion, id. at 1023, not all courts would agree with this proposition. See People v. Montoya, 63
Cal. Rptr. 73, 77 (Cal. Ct App. 1967) (stating that "authorities agree that the constitutional re-
quirement is not met where only characteristics of age, weight, height and race are mentioned").
126. See United States v. Swanner, 237 F. Supp. 69,71 (E.D. Tenn. 1964) ("Where a name
that would reasonably identify the subject to be arrested cannot be provided, then some other
means reasonable to the circumstances must be used to assist in the identification of the subject
of the warrant").
127. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which "John Doe"
warrants were held invalid for lack of particularizing identification information).
128. It is unclear whether this lack of authority is due to the obscurity of the issue or the
contextual nature of determining what is adequate for identification.
129. Montoya, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
130. See United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381,389 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that "physical
description of [defendant], coupled with the precise location at which he could be found, was
sufficient and the John Doe warrant was, therefore, valid"); Clark v. State, 527 So2d 161, 162
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (stating that "John Doe" warrant would be sufficient if physical descrip-
tion and location were included); Fomby v. State, 170 S.E.2d 585, 587 (Ga. Ct_ App. 1969)
(stating that "John Doe" search warrants containing physical descriptions of defendants and
specifying where they could be located were valid).
131. See State v. Pecha, 407 N.W.2d 760,765 (Neb. 1987) (holding that "warrant authoriz-
ing the search of 'John and/or Jane Doe' was invalid for insufficiency of description, even though
the probable location of such persons was also given"); State v. Douglas S., 709 P.2d 817, 818
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that "warrant authorizing the search of 'John Doe, who is known
to be in the vicinity of the described premises' is not sufficient to authorize a search"); State v.
Rollie M., 701 P.2d 1123,1125 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that probable location of person
to be searched was not sufficient information to make "John Doe" search warrant valid).
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circumstances of the case.'32 A suspect's precise location coupled with a
physical description of him seems particular enough to render a "John Doe"
warrant valid.'33 Conversely, an indefinite assertion about a suspect's proba-
ble location evidently will not satisfy most courts' standard for identifica-
tion."' While it is possible to discern a general idea as to what a court looks
for in determining the validity of a "John Doe" warrant, it is not entirely clear
how a court will treat a DNA warrant under the current standards.
C. Courts'Decisions Regarding Sufficiency ofIndictment
While the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution obligates
federal prosecutors to proceed by indictment, this indictment provision has not
been incorporated against the states.'35 Therefore, many states do not require
the commencement of criminal prosecutions by indictment. 36 However, many
states do use the indictment as an accusatory instrument, and in fact, prosecu-
tors in several jurisdictions have used it in employing this DNA profiling
technique. 37 While not all states, notably New York, offer significant guid-
ance in describing the defendant in an indictment, courts have upheld indict-
ments that listed the defendant by an alias or by an incorrect name that sounded
like the defendant's name. 38 These cases seem to show that minor errors in
132. See United States v. Swanner, 237 F. Supp. 69, 71 (E.D. Tenn. 1964) (noting that
what constitutes sufficient information depends upon what is reasonable under specific circum-
stances); DouglasS., 709 P.2d at 818 (same).
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting cases inwhich physical description
plus specific location rendered "John Doe" search warrant valid).
134. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (noting cases in which location described
in warrant was not specific enough to satisfy identification standard).
135. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury");
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62-66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not incorporate Fifth Amendment indictment
guarantee to states); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (same).
136. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 804(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 2001) (providing that
prosecution commences upon filing of complaint); N.Y. CRJM PRoc. LAW § 100.05 (McKinney
1992) (providing that filing of complaint commences prosecution); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2-
104 (1997) (stating that prosecution commences, inter alia, by finding indictment, presentment
or issuing of warrant); TEX. CuM PRoc. CoDE ANN. § 12.05(b) (Vernon 1977) ("The time
during the pendency of an indictment, information, or complaint shall not be computed in the
period of limitation."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.02(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (providing that
arrest warrant shall issue after issuance and filing of complaint, and that such filing commences
criminal prosecution).
137. See Barnes, supra note 6, at BI (noting use of DNA indictment in New York); Hoff-
man, supra note 13, atAl (noting use of DNA indictment in New Mexico); Lambe, supra note
18, at Al (noting use of DNA indictment in Missouri); Timms, supra note 13, at 1A (noting use
of DNA indictment in Texas).
138. See United States v. Clark, 541 F.2d 1016, 1018 (4th Cir. 1976) (concluding that
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identification will not lead to a court's finding the indictment insufficient.
However, this generalization about minor errors is not dispositive with regard
to DNA indictments. In fact; while there is always the potential for error in
DNA testing,"' and hence the possibility that a flawed DNA profile will merit
some type of error argument, an entirely separate argument surfaces when there
is no question as to the accuracy of the DNA profile. This other potential
argument stems from the purposes that indictments are supposed to serve. 40
The Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts have issued deci-
sions regarding the sufficiency and the purposes of an indictment. 41 These
cases indicate the following three importantpurposes ofindictments: (1)to list
the charges the defendant faces; (2) to notify the defendant of these charges;
and (3) to prevent potential double jeopardy problems.' 42 A DNA indictment
can still satisfy the first and third ofthese purposes because, even when the de-
fendant is unknown, an indictment can contain the elements of the offense,
which is the basis for satisfying the first and third requirements. However,
whether a DNA indictment fulfills the second requirement, which clearly con-
templates putting the defendant on notice ofthe charges against him, is highly
questionable.
defendant was not prejudiced by denial of pretrial motion to strike, as surplusage, from in-
dictment reference to him by phrase "al/Ia 'Mauser"); Thibodeau v. United States, 361 F.2d
443, 444 (5th Cir. 1966) (finding that indictment was not rendered fatally defective by fact
that it misspelled defendant's surname "Thibodeau" as "Thibobeau"); see also supra note
100 and accompanying text (providing states' typical requirements for identification in indict-
ments).
139. See DOJ I, supra note 30, at 80-85 (noting potential sources of error in DNAtesting).
Potential sources of error include sample mishandling and data-recording errors; faulty reagents,
equipment, controls, and techniques; evidence contamination; and analyst bias. Id.
140. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing generally recognized pur-
poses of indictments).
141. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,117 (1974) ("Our prior cases indicate that
an indictment is sufficient if it... contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly
informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and ... enables him to plead
an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense."); United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557-58 (1875) (noting that "the accused has the constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI));
United States v. Prentiss, 206 F.3d 960, 964 (10th Cir. 2000) (reiterating that "'[a]n indictment
is sufficient if contains the elements of the offense charged, putting the defendant on fair notice
of the charges against which he must defend, and if it enables a defendant to assert [a double
jeopardy defense]'" (quoting United States v. Peole, 929 F.2d 1476, 1478 (10th Cir. 1991)),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part en banc, 256 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 2001); People v. Grega, 531
N.E.2d 279, 282 (N.Y. 1988) (noting following purposes of indictment provides defendant
with fair notice of accusations against him so he can prepare his defense, prevents prosecutor
from usurping grand jury by ensuring that prosecutor indicts and tries defendant for same crime,
and protects defendant's right against double jeopardy).
142. See cases cited supra at note 141 (discussing purposes of indictment)
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D. Do DNA Warrants and ndictments Satisfy "Reasonable
Certainty" Standard?
When the name ofthe defendant is unknown, any name or description by
which he can be identified with reasonable certainty is the standard for
warrants and indictments in most jurisdictions.' 4' Does a DNA profile iden-
tify a defendant with reasonable certainty? One can argue that a DNA profile
provides reasonably certain identification."M Indeed, experts now consider a
DNA match virtually conclusive evidence of identity because DNA samples
from individuals are unique 4s MilwaukeeAssistant District AttomeyNorman
Gahn has indicated that he will argue that DNA goes well beyond a reasonable
certainty.1 46  In fact, Wisconsin officials have claimed that the chances of
matching the wrong person to the DNA profile are exceptionally low.'47 Of
course, this inquiry will necessarily implicate the reliability of DNA testing;
however, as previously discussed, courts have already addressed the issues of
reliability and admissibility of DNA evidence, and all jurisdictions appear to
accept such evidence as reliable." s
In the first ruling of its kind, a California judge upheld a "John Doe"
arrest warrant that listed only a "black male" with a specific DNA profile. 49
Paul Eugene Robinson became the first person that police arrested on a DNA
warrant after authorities got a "cold hit" on his DNA profile from the state's
DNA databank.s° At the hearing on the warrant's validity, the defense argued
143. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing state and federal laws
providing requirements for warrants and indictments).
144. In fact, this argument prevailed in the first challenge to a DNA warrant or indictment
See Hallissy, Judge Upholds Use ofDNA Warrants, supra note 19, at Al (noting that judge up-
held warrant because DNA met "reasonably certain" standard).
145. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text (discussing DNA typing technology
and uniqueness of individual's DNA).
146. See Dedman, supra note 104, atA6 (quoting Norman Gahn as saying: "Myargument
is going to be that genetic code goes well beyond reasonable certainty.").
147. See Useful Police Tool Goes to Waste, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 1999, at 28A (noting
Wisconsin officials' position that chances of matching wrong person to DNA warrant are one
in billions).
148. See supra Part H (discussing DNA typing technology and admissibility of DNA
evidence). Of course, the defendant can always dispute the admissibility of DNA evidence in
an individual case. For example, if the prosecution has performed DNA testing on a sample
from the defendant and the results were inculpatory, the defense may want to attack the quality
and legitimacy of such testing. See DOJ DI, supra note 11, at 44 (providing advice to defense
counsel in cases involving DNA evidence). Another option for the defense is to consider
seeking new tests if more discriminating tests have emerged since the initial inculpatory testing.
See id. (noting this option as alternative to attacking quality ofprosecution's DNA testing).
149. See Hallissy, Judge Upholds Use of DNA Warrants, supra note 19, atAl (discussing
validity of arrest warrant identifying defendant solely by DNA profile).
150. See id. (describing sequence of events preceding Robinson's arrest).
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that the warrant was unconstitutional because it did not name the defendant.
151
Robinson's attorney claimed that the warrant "was so vague that any black
man could have been arrested and held until DNA work was completed.""5 2
Rejecting this argument, the judge agreed with prosecutors and noted that "a
DNA profile is as definitive as a person's name or physical description.
15 3
On appeal, the California Supreme Court also refused to dismiss the charges,
creating a precedent that the state Attorney General's spokesman called "of
major significance for prosecutors in California."1" 4
In Wisconsin, a twice-convicted rapist currently in prison became the
second person to be charged with rape using a "John Doe" warrant.155 On
March 14,2001, prosecutors charged Bobby Richard Dabney, Jr. with a 1994
rape, linking him to the crime through a DNA sample obtained from him in
1996, a year after he went to prison."5 6 Dabney challenged the "John Doe"
warrant, alleging that 'the warrant wrongly circumvented the six-year statute
of limitations, didn't properly identify the alleged attacker when it was issued,"
and was unfair to the suspect."7 A Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge
disagreed and, like the courts in California, refused to dismiss the case.'
In the past, reasonably certain identification has included aliases, ad-
dresses, physical descriptions, and other particularizing identification informa-
tion.15 9 These types of information share a common characteristic - physical
recognizability. Anyone, including the subject of the warrant or indictment,
can look at one of these types of descriptions on a warrant or indictment
and then compare the description to the defendant. This immediate recog-
nizability is not true for a DNA profile, which prosecutors can match to the
defendant only through scientific testing. Thus, defendants could focus on
151. See id. (noting defense attorney's arguments). Although the article does not go into
detail about either the prosecutor's or the defendant's arguments at the hearing, the defendant's




154. See Chapman, supra note 19 (discussing California Supreme Court's refusal to
dismiss charges against rape suspect).
155. See David Doege, DNA Brings Charge in 1994Rape, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTNEL, Mar.
15, 2001, at IA (discussing use of "John Doe" warrant to charge Bobby Richard Dabney, Jr.
with 1994 rape).
156. See idl (discussing Dabney's arrest).
157. See David Doege, Rape Case Hinging on DNA Flawed, Lawyer Says, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEl, JuL 9,2001, at IA (noting lawyer's arguments for motion to dismiss).
158. See David Doege, Move to Dismiss Rape Case Based on DNA Denied, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, Jul. 27, 2001, at 1B (noting judge's refusal to dismiss charges against Dabney).
159. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing what information meets
"reasonable certainty" standard).
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this aspect of DNA profiles in fashioning an argument against their identifica-
tion value.
E. The Notice Function of Warrants and Indictments
Defendants could plausibly argue that although it is particularly suited
for identification in some situations,"6 DNA profiling is not appropriate in the
arrest warrant or indictment context. This argument stems from the idea that
no person knows his own DNA profile; therefore, charging someone in this
manner does not put him on notice that charges are pending against him.
DNA is arguably the most accurate description of an individual, yet it is a
deficient means of identification for an arrest warrant or an indictment. DNA
profiles are more certain than any other "John Doe" descriptive options, but
at the same time, they are worse than all other modes of description in terms
of notice. Although'courts normally discuss notice to the defendant in the
indictment context, notice is also arguably appropriate in the arrest warrant
context,16 especially in a situation when a court uses both indictments and
arrest warrants to achieve the same purpose: to toll the statute of limitations
indefinitely and to preserve the chance for a criminal prosecution. 62 It is
important to note that notice is most often thought of in contexts other than
just notifying the defendant that he is being sought by the government. 63
Regardless of how this concept of notice has been applied in the past, the
current use of DNA warrants and indictments may provide an ideal vehicle for
the explicit application of the notice concept to this DNA profiling tactic.
However, proponents ofDNAwarrants andindictments have apotentially
convincing retort to the proposed notice function of warrants and indictments.
160. See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which DNA was
used for identification).
161. In fact, at least one court has noted that warrants serve a notice function. See United
States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 756 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that "a warrant serves the purpose
of notifying the subject of the search that his privacy must yield to the public's need for law
enforcement"). It is important to note that the Christine court was examining the validity of a
search warrant. IM at 750. However, in a later case, the court mentioned this notice function
when analyzing the validity of a "John Doe" arrest warrant See United States v. Doe, 703 F.2d
745, 750 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that notice function relates "to the arresting officer and to the
subject of the arrest"). "As much as to assure the existence of probable cause, the warrant
requirement is designed to inform both the subject and the executing officer of the scope of
action to be taken based on that probable cause." Id.
162. See supra notes 6, 13 and accompanying text (noting law enforcement officials' pro-
fessed purpose of filing DNA warrants or indictments to toll statutes of limitations).
163. Courts discussing the notice function of indictments often are concerned with the
indictment containing the elements of the offense, thereby informing the defendant ofthe charges
against him, supra note 161. Although the Third Circuit originally mentioned the notice argu-
ment in reference to search warrants, that court later applied the same reasoning to arrest war-
rants. Id.
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First, they would point out that this notice function is not typically used in the
sense of merely informing the defendant that he has been charged.'" Rather,
the general construction of this concept focuses on informing the defendant of
the scope of the government's authority over him, particularly the specific
charges with which he is charged. Second, they may raise the more pragmatic
issue that these instruments and their contents are not generally matters of
public knowledge, which undercuts the notion that a defendant would be put on
notice if he is described particularly in them. This observation is even more
accurate regarding arrest warrants. At least with an indictment, there has been
some type ofpublic involvement vis a vis the grand jury, and the indictment can
be regarded at least somewhat as a public document. The same is not true for
arrest warrants, which judicial officers issue upon a showing ofprobable cause
by the government. The defendant is often unaware that authorities have issued
a warrant for his arrest until after he is in custody.
IV Statutes of Limitations and DNA Warrant End-Run
A. History of Statutes ofLimitations
Statutes of limitations provide a fixed time period that, upon expiration,
precludes the government from prosecuting a crime. The federal government
and nearly every state have such statutes.s Limitations periods for criminal
prosecution were adopted early in the development of American law. 66 How-
164. See supra notes 140-42, 161 and accompanying text (discussing notice function of
warrants and indictments).
165. See DANiELW. SHuAN&ALx RMCALLSMnIJus CEANDTEPRosECU-
TION OF OLD CRIMS 56 (2000) (noting that federal crimes and vast majority of state crimes are
subject to limitations periods). An exception is Wyoming, which has no statutes of limitations.
Id. Although limitations periods are based primarily on the seriousness of the crime and the
difficulties in bringing prosecution, almost every jurisdiction does not have a statute of limita-
tions for murder. IM at 4. In this respect, murder "seems to be a special case," and it is treated
differently because "most legal systems and moral codes regard murder as the supreme wrong."
Id. Also, the notion that there should be a time limit on a government's pursuit of a criminal
wrong is not universally accepted. Id. at 56. Ironically, this rule was not widely accepted in the
English common law. Id. Instead, limitation periods may be "an example of the influence of
Roman legal theory that was, to some legal thinkers of the early United States, more ideologi-
cally attractive than the English common law." Id. "It is easy to imagine how a revolutionary
society eager to overthrow a discredited political system might be attracted by the notion of the
fresh start implicit in the concept of limitation." Id. For more on the history of criminal statutes
of limitations in American law, see Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Lim-
itations with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 37 WM. & MARYL. REV. 199,247-60 (1995) (discussing
history of criminal statutes of limitations).
166. See SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 165, at 56 ("In the United States, in spite of the
English common law background of American law, the principle of limitation was accepted at
a very early stage and has been applied ever since."). "A general limitation period of 1 year on
the prosecution of crimes applied in colonial Massachusetts as early as 1652, and similar sta-
1611
1612 58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1585 (2001)
ever, despite their deep roots and pervasive nature, criminal statutes of limita-
tions are not constitutionally mandated; 67 rather, they are subject to legisla-
tive choice and can be amended or even repealed altogether." In fashioning
statutes of limitations, legislatures often vary the coverage of the statutes, as
well the length of the limitations period, according to the crime involved.
169
Additionally, legislatures have the ability to lengthen, or even to shorten, a
limitations period if prevailing social and political concerns warrant such
action 70 Although legislatures set statutes of limitations, the judiciary, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, has recognized the valuable role such statutes
serve in the criminal justice system."'
tutes were introduced in other states during the 18th century. Federal crimes have been subject
to a limitation period since 1790." Id.
167. See I CHARLEs E. TORCIA, WHARToN's CRziM AL LAW § 92, at 628-29 (15th ed.
1993) (noting that statutes of limitations are "not a matter of right but legislative grace").
168. See Adlestein, supra note 165, at 250-51 (noting that legislatures can change time
periods in statutes of limitations).
169. See id. at 251-52 n.227 (noting sometimes dramatic variation in criminal statutes of
limitations and listing examples). "For example, the federal statute has a single general limits-
tions period for all noncapital offenses." Id. at 251 n.221. In state statutes of limitations,
however, limitations periods often vary according to the degree of the crime. Id. The federal
statute provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be pros-
ecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the
information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed."
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1994). State statutes of limitations for felonies vary in duration. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENTAL CODE §§ 800-801 (West 1985) (stating that prosecution for offense punishable
by imprisonment in state prison for eight years or more shall be commenced within six years
after commission of offense and prosecution for offense punishable by imprisonment in state
prison shall be commenced within three years after commission of offense); N.Y. CRIM PRoC.
§ 30.10(2)(b) (McKinney 1992) (stating that prosecution for felonies other than Class A felonies
must be commenced within five years after commission of crime), TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODEANN.
§ 12.01(5XC) (Supp. 2001) (stating that limitation period for prosecution of aggravated sexual
assault is ten years from eighteenth birthday of victim); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.74(1) (West
1996) (stating that prosecution for felony must be commenced within six years after commission
of crime). These are the limitations periods that necessitated the use of DNA warrants or indict-
ments in these jurisdictions. There is a current trend in many states to extend or abolish statutes
of limitations in rape cases. See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text (discussing exten-
sion or abolition of statutes of limitations in rape cases in many states).
170. See Adlestein, supra note 165, at 252 (noting recent trend of lengthening statutes of
limitations for offenses such as child abuse and financial crimes). The author also noted that
"statutes of limitations are... flexible instruments of legislative policy and often reflect the
social concerns of the particular time and locality." Id.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (noting that statutes of
limitations protect defendants by ensuring them ability to mount fair defense); United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (stating that statutes of limitations are "primary guarantee
against bringing overly stale criminal charges" (citation omitted)); Toussie v. United States, 397
U.S. 112, 114 (1970) (noting that such statutes protect defendant's right to defend himself);
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135,139 (1879) (noting thatthese statutes "are vital to the welfare
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B. Purposes of Statutes ofLimitations
1. Enabling Prosecutions to Be Based on Fresh Evidence
One of the primary reasons for having criminal statutes of limitations is
to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.' A key concern in protecting
this right is to ensure that prosecutions are based upon relatively fresh evi-
dence.' 73 The passage of time inevitably has numerous deleterious effects on
evidence.'74 "[E]vidence is, by its nature, fragile and susceptible to destruction
over time, as memories fade and witnesses die or become otherwise unavail-
able." ' 5 One ofthe more pronounced effects that time has on evidence is the
diminution of memory."7 6 Statutes of limitations reflect the limits on the
reliability of human memory and an individual's ability to remember past
events accurately.' Although every facet of human memory is not completely
understood, it is generally accepted that the passage of time has a negative
impact on an individual's ability to remember past events. 7 ' This diminishing
of society" and "are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence"); People
v. McAllister, 352 N.Y.S.2d 360, 363 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1974) (noting that statutes of limitations
upon criminal prosecution represent public policy); State v. Homer, 936 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Te=.
Ct App. 1996) (noting that statutes of limitations are primary guarantee against bringing of
overly stale criminal charges); John v. State, 291 N.W.2d 502, 507 (Wis. 1980) (noting that
criminal statutes of limitations serve number of functions including protecting accused from
having to defend himself against charges of remoteness, ensuring that criminal prosecutions are
based on evidence of recent origin, and ensuring that law enforcement officials act promptly to
investigate criminal activity).
172. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing various rights of accused, including right not
to be deprived of liberty without due process of law); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing
accused's right to speedy trial); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,322 (1971) (noting that
statutes of limitations "provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an
irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced"); see also
SHUMAN & SMaH, supra note 165, at 60 (noting that "bringing a late prosecution deprives the
defendant of the right to a fair trial"); Adlestein, supra note 165, at 261-62 (noting one purpose
of criminal statutes of limitations is to allow defendant fair trial).
173. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt 1 (1985).
174. See SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 165, at 60-61 (noting adverse effects that passage
of time has on various types of evidence).
175. Thigpen v. Smith, 792 F.2d 1507,1514 (1lthCir. 1986).
176. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970) (noting that basic facts
become obscured as time passes); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt 1 (1985) (stating that
memories fade as time passes); SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 165, at 60 (noting that memory
is affected negatively by time).
177. See SHUMAN& SMrH, supra note 165, at 87 (discussing "the effect ofthe passage of
substantial time between the act and the trial on the ability to reach an accurate determination
of the relevant facts").
178. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt. 1 (1985) (noting that memories fade with the
passage of time); SHUMAN & SMrr% supra note 165, at 60, 87-97 (discussing workings of
human memory and noting that effect of time passage on memory is generally negative).
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capacity to remember affects the criminal defendant in two ways. First, it
hampers his ability to defend himself by not being able to recollect relevant
events, which includes 'the ability to offer testimony, to identify other poten-
tial witnesses, and to assist in preparing cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses." 79 Second, the defendant is prejudiced by the inability of other
witnesses to accurately remember relevant events.18 These problems are mag-
nified when one recognizes that ascertaining the truth in a criminal proceeding
is often difficult, even in the absence of a long delay in prosecution."' Even
when prosecution of a crime is commenced within the limitations period, an
infallible recollection of what actually happened will occur rarely." This
result is not surprising considering the circumstances surrounding a criminal
event. That is, such events typically catch witnesses by surprise, which means
that their capacity to correctly perceive what is happening is subject to the
initial shock of being at the event in the first place. 83 Other factors such as the
trauma of the event, the concern for one's own safety, and the concern for the
safety of other people hamper a witness's ability to accurately perceive a
criminal event.1 4 Thus, "[i]nthe prosecution of old crimes, the passage oftime
exacerbates these normal problems of sorting out what happened."18
5
Other evidentiary problems caused by time lapses between the crime and
its prosecution include witnesses who have died or moved, as well as physical
evidence that has been lost, misidentified, or mishandled. 86 "The longer the
delay between the crime and its prosecution, the greater the likelihood that
some critical evidence will be lost.""' Even if evidence is not lost, a long delay
between the commission of a crime and its prosecution might still diminish a
179. SHUMAN & SMiTH, supra note 165, at 61. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
402 (1960) (noting that recollection of events is only one component of defendant's ability to
defend himself). In Dusky, the Court considered a defendant's competency to stand trial. Id.
In this context, the Court held that orientation as to time and place and some recollection of
events was not sufficient to pass the test of competency. Id. In so holding, the Court implicitly
recognized the importance of being able to remember past events accurately in order to assist
in one's own defense. Id.
180. See SHUMAN & SMrTH, supra note 165, at 87 (noting that passage of time affects
ability to accurately remember relevant events).
181. See id. (noting that "[a]ccurate reconstruction of past events is problematic in the
prosecution of all crimes").
182. See id. at 88 (noting that even in absence of delay in prosecution, criminal justice
system has difficulty in resolving matters of proof).
183. See id. (recognizing that prospective witnesses do not realize they may have to recount
criminal event they are perceiving in future criminal prosecution).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. MoDELPENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt 1 (1985); see SHUMAN& SMITH, supra note 165, at
61 (describing difficulty in locating defense witnesses when there is long delay in prosecution).
187. SHUMAN & SMi supra note 165, at 88.
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defendant's chance of having a fair trial. "Evidence is perishable, and with the
passage of significant time, both physical and testimonial evidence are inher-
ently less available."s These concerns further reflect the possibility of an
unfair trial and erroneous conviction when there is delay in prosecution.'89
2. Promoting Repose
In addition to protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial, statutes of
limitations serve other functions primarily geared toward societal benefit. By
promoting repose, statutes of limitations give potential defendants the certainty
that after a prescribed number of years, they will no longer be subject to crim-
inal prosecution."9 This purpose benefits society in at least three ways. First,
it allows individuals to escape the shadow of impending criminal charges,
which, in turn, may encourage them to stop worrying about being charged with
a crime and to take a beneficial interest in contributing to society. 9' Second,
encouraging repose allows the general public to cease being "preoccup[ied]
with the past when it no longer serves a significant present purpose."'" Fi-
nally, repose benefits society insofar as it allows law enforcement to devote
resources to more recent criminal activity. 93 The Supreme Court has spoken
favorably about the repose function of statutes of limitations,194 and perhaps
the Court most aptly described this function when it noted that these statutes
"promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs." 95
3. Forgiveness and the Reduced Need for Punishment
Even when a long delay in prosecution does not prejudice the defendant,
there comes a point when the retributive effects of criminal punishment
188. Id. at 97.
189. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt. 1 (1985) (noting that "possibility of erroneous
conviction is minimized when prosecution is prompt").
190. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970) (noting purpose of statutes
of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution).
191. See Adlestein, supra note 165, at 266 (noting rebuttal argument that statutes of
limitations create broad, inflexible rule that limits prosecutors' ability to exercise discretion in
evaluating particular offender).
192. PAUL-L ROBINSON, CRMNALLAWDEFLzNS § 202(b) (1984).
193. See Adlestein, supra note 165, at 266 (noting argument that "expenditure of society's
resources in criminal prosecution... and the costs to the community that follow from removing
a now productive member from its midst are not warranted").
194. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (noting that statutes of
limitations "are made for the repose of society and the protection of those who may... have lost
their means of defense" (citation omitted)); Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (noting "principle that
criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose" (citation and
internal quotation omitted)).
195. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
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disappear, and the punishment would serve only as a vindictive measure. 6
Vindictiveness generally is not recognized as a rationale for punishment, and
there are compelling reasons to forgive past wrongs. Two reasons are to
foster "social healing" and to resolve the ill feelings one has toward another
for a past wrongful act." "[A]fter a protracted period the retributive impulse
which may have existed in the community is likely to yield to a sense of
compassion aroused by the prosecution for an offense long forgotten.'' 98 Re-
lated to this idea of forgiveness is the notion that as time passes, the need for
punishment decreases.' If authorities do not catch the perpetrator for other
criminal activity, there is at least, a fair chance that he has self-reformed,
thereby diminishing the need for a criminal sanction that punishes past con-
duct.20 Of course, if he has not reformed and continues to engage in criminal
pursuits, the authorities can prosecute him for these subsequent crimes, pro-
vided they are not also time-barred. °1
4. Encouraging Prompt Investigation of Crimes
Another espoused purpose for statutes of limitations is to encourage law
enforcement to investigate crimes promptly.'° Alternatively, this purpose
could be characterized as one that discourages careless investigative work.
Although it may seem self-evident that law enforcement officials always have
incentives to promptly and professionally investigate crimes, one should not
discount this purpose of these statutes, especially in a situation involving the
DNA indictment tactic, whereby law enforcement officials purposefully cir-
196. See SHUMAN & SMrm, supra note 165, at 12 (noting that objection to prosecution of
old crimes is partly founded on notion that such prosecution is vindictive).
197. Id. The authors note the modem trend of therapists and mental health professionals
to advocate forgiveness as a part of a victim's recovery from a trauma. Id. Psychologists now
are performing studies to gauge the effects of forgiveness on psychological health. Id. Al-
though this is a recent development, the notion of forgiveness has long been a central theme of
religious thinking. Id. Thus, "[t]he recommendation of forgiveness comes ... not merely as
a matter of moral duty but as a matter of personal restoration." Id. The notion that refraining
from punishment diminishes the deterrent value of the law supports a counter-argument to
forgiveness. Id. at 14. "The fact that a particular accused may be unlikely to re-offend does not
detract from the deterrent value of punishing the offender to deter others." Id. at 29. In fact,
proponents of this theory would argue that the fact that an old crime is punished enhances the
force of the deterrent value. Id. By punishing an offender many years after commission of the
crime, society "effectively emphasizes" that punishment is inevitable. Id. If this message regis-
ters with other offenders, the deterrent effect is intensified. I




202. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (noting that one purpose of
statutes of limitations is to encourage law enforcement to investigate crimes promptly).
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cumvent the statute of limitations. 3 Additionally, one should not overlook
the protection to the public afforded by prompt investigation. In fact, at least
one commentator has equated this protection for the public with the protection
for the defendant that such statutes provide.'
C. Using DNA Warrants and Indictments to Circumvent Statutes
ofLimitations
Proponents of DNA warrants and indictments argue that statutes of lim-
itations in rape cases are outmoded due to the advances in DNA technology."'
Scientists can perform DNA testing on small samples of evidence that are not
subject to change over time.2" Thus, concern with the staleness of evidence
may not be of much consequence with respect to the DNA sample itself."
Although improvements in DNA technology may reduce the risk of stale
evidence, particularly in the DNA sample itself, there could be other disputed
issues involving other types of evidence that may diminish in value over
time.s Moreover, regardless of the probative value of DNA identification,
the other rationales for statutes of limitations still might weigh against allow-
ing prosecutors to toll the limitations period indefinitely.2"
Regarding the preservation-of-evidence purpose of statutes of limitations,
lack of opportunity to perform subsequent testing could prejudice a defendant
who is prosecuted under a DNA indictment. First; when there is a significant
passage of time between indictment and commencement of trial, there is
always the possibility that someone simply will misplace or mislabel the
203. See supra notes 6, 10, 13 and accompanying text (discussing use of DNA warrants
and indictments to toll applicable statute of limitations).
204. See Adlestein, supra note 165, at 261-62 (noting that "rationale for criminal statutes
of limitations involves both the protection of the individual defendant from a potentially unfair
trial and a now perhaps undeserved punishment, and the protection of society from unpros-
ecuted offenders, by using the sanction of preclusion to encourage law enforcement officials to
promptly investigate and prosecute crime").
205. See C.J. Chivers, As DNA Aids Rape Inquiries, Statutory Limits Block Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2000, at B1 (noting that DNA profiling has become so accurate in matching
suspects to crimes that historic rationale for statutes of limitations is now in question); Editorial,
To Ensure Justice, Allow DNA Evidence in Novel Ways, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR
(Norfolk), Jan. 16,2001, at BlO (noting that laws should reflect advances in technology).
206. See supra note47 and aecompanyingtext(notingthatDNAdoes not change overtime).
207. But see infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (discussing potential prejudice to
defendant when defendant is unable to perform subsequent DNA testing).
208. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (discussing issues that may need to be
resolved by use of more conventional evidence, although that evidence has potential of becoming
less reliable over time).
209. See infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text (discussing frustration of some pur-
poses of statutes of limitations by DNA warrants and indictments, and by legislative changes
in existing statutes).
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evidence,21 thereby depriving the defendant of an opportunity to perform his
own DNA profiling analysis on the evidence collected from the crime scene.
Second, and perhaps more importantly in sexual assault cases, the crime scene
sample from which the suspect's DNA is extracted is often so small that, after
the initial prosecution tests, further testing is no longer possible because the
prosecution consumes the entire sample.2 ' This alone would severely hamper
a defendant's ability to rebut the prosecution's identification evidence. In
such a situation, the defendant would be faced with DNA identification evi-
dence, tested many years in the past, that the prosecution claims is conclusive
proof of the fact that the defendant, at the very least, was at the crime scene.
Yet, the defendant is deprived of the ability to confirm or to challenge the
prosecution's tests."'
Even though DNA profiling may establish the identity of the assailant,
the defendant may still argue that he did not rape the victim. For example,
two specific arguments that a defendant could raise are that the sexual act was
consensual or that his DNA was at the crime scene, but he is not the rapist.21 3
In a consent defense, the DNA identification of the defendant is not conclu-
sively incriminating because the defendant is not disputing the fact that he had
sex with the person claiming to be the victim. Rather, his position is that there
was no crime in the first place. In order to buttress this claim, the defendant
almost certainly will attempt to produce supporting evidence, including
witnesses. Unlike the DNA evidence itself, however, these types of evidence
are subject to deterioration as time passes." 4 Similarly, if a defendant claims
that his DNA was at the crime scene prior to the rape with which he is
charged, he will rely on other evidence to prove that he was not present when
the rape occurred. A lengthy period of time between the crime and its prose-
210. See DOJ II, supra note 30, at 80 (noting that nislabelings of samples can occur at any
point at which evidence is handled); supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (noting that
passage of time increases likelihood of misplacing of evidence).
211. See DOJ I, supra note 30, at 6 (noting that DNA typing procedures sometimes cannot
be repeated because there is too little sample).
212. Although this situation may be particularly problematic when the passage of time
compounds the defendant's inability to test the DNA, it also could occur even when prosecution
timely commences. In any event, one possible solution would be to require the prosecution to
preserve enough of the sample for the defendant to perform his own tests. See DOJ II, supra
note 30, at 81, 87 (noting that there should be opportunity for retesting). "The ultimate safe-
guard against error due to sample mixup is to provide an opportunity for retesting." Id. at 81.
"A wrongly accused person's best insurance against the possibility of being falsely incriminated
is the opportunity to have the testing repeated." Id. at 87.
213. See Jonathan W. DiehlNote, DraftingaFairDNA Exception to the Statute ofLimita-
tions in Sexual Assault Cases, 39 JURUMETRICS J. 431, 438-39 (1999) (discussing potential
disputed issues that would require more traditional forms of evidence).
214. See id. at438 (stating that "defendant's abilityto gather evidence, witnesses, and other-
wise develop this type of defense generally will decay as time elapses").
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cution could hamper the defendant's ability to find alibi witnesses or other
evidence to show that he was elsewhere when the crime occurred. 215
An additional concern in using DNA warrants and indictments to toll the
statutes of limitations stems from another one of the statutes' underlying
rationales: to encourage prompt investigation of crimes.216 With the incredi-
ble identification abilities of DNA, law enforcement officials could be lulled
into accepting this tactic as a panacea for solving violent crimes217 when, in
fact, these crimes will never be solved unless the DNA profile eventually is
matched to a suspect.218 Add to this the fact that many rapists are repeat
offenders, 219 and it becomes clear that authorities should not use DNA war-
rants and indictments as substitutes for active investigation of crimes.
The use of DNA warrants and indictments also thwarts other policy
concerns such as promoting repose and recognizing the reduced need for pun-
ishment.Y0  Of course, proponents of DNA warrants and indictments would
argue that statutes of limitations are not a criminal defendant's only protection
against unfair prosecution. They would point to the constitutional protection
found in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment
Speedy Trial Clause. However, these are poor substitutes for the protection
afforded by statutes of limitations. First, the Due Process Clause protects
against pre-accusation delay,"1 which is not relevant when DNA warrants and
indictments have been obtained, because bringing formal charges commences
215. See id. (noting that "defendant will most likely rely on witnesses to prove that he was
not at the site at the time of the rape").
216. See supra Part V.BA (discussing purpose of statutes of limitations).
217. See Erin Hallissy, Bill Gets Tougher on Rapists: Statute of Limitations Would Be
Repealed in DNA Cases, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14,2000, at Al (quoting member of Criminal Jus-
tice Policy Foundation as saying that time limits are needed to "'help keep the DAs and cops
focused on the investigation'").
218. SeeAnnLQLordoDNA DatabanksRestoreHopesfor 'Cold Cases', BALT. SuN, Feb.
20, 2001, at IA (noting that DNA technology is not "magic bullet"). Of course, law enforce-
ment officials are hoping that by tolling the statute, the suspect eventually would- be identified
through a "cold hit" in a DNA database. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing
DNA databases). However, due to the tremendous backlog of samples that await entry into the
databases, there is no way to tell how long it would take to find an assailant See supra note 11
and accompanying text (noting large backlogs of DNA samples).
219. See Heather Lourie, ClockMay Cease to Aid Rapists, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER,
Jan. 16, 2000, atAl (noting that many rapists are repeat offenders). "[S]tudies show that most
rapists have committed at least five other rapes before they're caught" Id.
220. See supra Parts IVJ3.2-IV.B3 (discussing purposes of statutes of limitations).
221. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (noting that Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause "would require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that the pre-
indictment delay. . . caused substantial prejudice to [defendant's] rights to a fair trial"). The
Court also noted that there is "no need to press the Sixth Amendment into service to guard
against the mere possibility that pre-accusation delays will prejudice the defense in a criminal
case since statutes of limitation already perform that function." Id. at 323.
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the prosecution. If DNA warrants and indictments are found to be valid, then
the Due Process Clause protection against pre-accusation delay becomes irrel-
evant because the prosecution has commenced before the applicable statute
of limitations has run. Therefore, the risk of delay in the DNA warrant and
indictment context stems from the time the charges are filed until the "John
Doe" defendant is identified and brought to trial.
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is activated at the com-
mencement of a criminal prosecution.'m In determining whether a particular
defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial, the Supreme Court
has identified four factors: the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant."'m How-
ever, those who argue that the Speedy Trial Clause affords protection in lieu
of statutes of limitations are implying that a broad judicial mechanism is a
satisfactory substitute for a precise legislative instrument. Although speedy
trial protection may aid defendants in some instances, it does not serve the
same prejudice-prevention function of statutes of limitations. 24 "The Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial is.. . not primarily intended to prevent
prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected
primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations."' 5 Fur-
thermore, the argument that statutes of limitations are not the exclusive
protection for defendants overlooks the legislative nature of such statutes - by
employing this new tactic, law enforcement officials are essentially usurping
the legislatures' authority to make these policyjudgments. Ofcourse, legisla-
tures are free to amend existing statutes of limitations or even to repeal them
altogether," 6 which several states have done in sexual assault cases.'27
222. Id. at313.
223. Barker v. Wimgo, 407 U.S. 514,530 (1972).
224. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (noting primary functions of
speedy trial guarantee).
225. Id. The right to a speedy trial "is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy
incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of
liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life
caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges." Id. In a more recent case,
the Court indicated that the Speedy Trial Clause may actually play a role in protecting a criminal
defendant from possible prejudice to his defense due to delay. See Doggett v. United States,
505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992) (noting that prejudice due to delay is one factor among several
Barker factors requiring consideration). The Court also noted that there could be presumptive
prejudice and that this "presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies
over time." Id. at 652. However, no courts have applied the Doggett analysis, and it is unclear
what impact this case will have on the Court's well-established Speedy Trial jurisprudence.
226. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (noting legislatures' ability to change
statutes of limitations).
227. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text (discussing current trend of states
repealing statutes of limitations in rape cases when DNA evidence is present).
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D. State Legislatures Are Taking Action
Faced with the fixed time periods during which prosecution must com-
mence, law enforcement officials have turned to DNA warrants and indict-
ments to circumvent the statutes of limitations.' This creative tactic, how-
ever, is not the only means of preserving the chance to prosecute a criminal
many years after commission of a crime. In a recent trend, many state legisla-
tures are reevaluating statutes of limitations in rape cases, and some already
have extended or repealed the time constraints in such cases. 9 For example,
California recently eliminated its statute of limitations in rape cases if DNA
evidence is analyzed within two years of the crime." The law also extends
228. See supra note 6, 10, 13 and accompanying text (noting use of this DNA profiling
tactic).
229. See Lynn Bartels, Rape Statute May Be Extended, RoCKYMOUNTAINNEws, Feb. 23,
2001, at 14A (noting Colorado legislature's consideration of bill to eliminate ten year statute
of limitations for sexual assault crimes); Malcolm Johnson, Bill Aims to Toughen Rape and
Fetus Laws, DETROrr NEWS, Feb. 21, 2001, at 7 (noting Michigan legislature's consideration
of bill to toll statute of limitations, when DNA evidence is available, until assailant is identi-
flied); Robert Tanner, DNA Brings Shift in Statutes of Limitations, SAN DmGO UNoN-TWB.,
Mar. 18,2000, at A10 (noting that Hawaii, New York, and Wisconsin are reexamining statutes
of limitations in rape cases); Today at the Capitol, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 20, 2001, at 3
(noting Idaho legislature's consideration of bill to extend statute of limitations on rape when
DNA evidence is present); Richard Willing, Mystery Suspects Charged Through DNA, USA
TODAY, Apr. 3, 2000, at 3A (noting that legislatures in Nevada, Florida, and New Jersey have
eliminated time limits for filing rape charges).
230. CAL. PIENAL CODE § 803(h) (West Supp. 2001). The new law provides in relevant
part:
(hX1) Notwithstanding the limitation of time described in Section 800, the limita-
tions period for commencing prosecution for a felony offense described in subpara-
graph (A) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 290, where the limitations
period set forth in Section 800 has not expired as of January 1, 2001, or the offense
is committed on or after January 1,2001, shall be 10 years from the commission of
the offense, or one year from the date on which the identity of the suspect is
conclusively established by DNA testing, whichever is later, provided, however,
that the one-year period from the establishment of the identity of the suspect shall
only apply when either of the following conditions is met
(A) For an offense committed prior to January 1, 2001, biological evidence
collected in connection with the offense is analyzed for DNA type no later than
January 1,2004.
(B) For an offense committed on or after January 1, 2001, biological evidence
collected in connection with the offense is analyzed for DNA type no later than two
years from the date of the offense.
(2) In the event the conditions set forth in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1)
are not met, the limitations period for commencing prosecution for a felony offense
described in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 290,
where the limitations period set forth in Section 800 has not expired as of January
1, 2001, or the offense is committed on or after January 1, 2001, shall be 10 years
from the commission of the offense.
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the statute of limitations to ten years in cases in which there is no DNA evi-
dence.23' Similarly, Minnesota has eliminated its statute of limitations in rape
cases if DNA evidence is available.232 Alternatively, at least one state has
considered a bill that specifically would allow the use of "John Doe" indict-
ments.
233
The key difference between this legislative action and the use of DNA
warrants and indictments is the legislative nature of statutes of limitations.
These statutes are a matter of "legislative grace," and as such they are subject
to modification by the legislatures.23 4 Although this legislative action may be
more politically legitimate, it does not address the underlying purposes of
statutes of limitations. In other words, the concerns that these statutes of lim-
itations address are still present even if a state legislature decides to eliminate
the limitations period.
In the states that have decided to eliminate the statute of limitations on
rape, the legislatures have made a public policy decision involving the balanc-
ing of the defendant's interests with the state's interests in justice. These
decisions reflect the notion that rape is a sufficiently egregious crime to war-
rant the same treatment as murder, a crime that traditionally has not been
subject to a limitations period. 35 Apparently, however, it took the advent of
DNA technology to shift the balance in favor of the state's interest injustice.
231. Id.
232. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62826(e) (West Supp. 2001). The law now provides:
(e) Notwithstanding the limitations in paragraph (c), indictments or complaints for
violation of sections 609.342 to 609.344 may be found or made and filed in the
proper court at any time after commission of the offense, if physical evidence is
collected and preserved that is capable of being tested for its DNA characteristics.
If this evidence is not collected and preserved and the victim was 18 years old or
older at the time of the offense, the prosecution must be commenced within nine
years after the commission of the offense.
Id.
233. H.B. 1216, 62d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2000). The bill provided in perti-
nent part: "Section 12: Filing of indictment Allows an indictment to be filed against an
unnamed offender if there is sufficient DNA evidence available to determine the identifying
characteristics of the offender's genetic material." Id.
234. See TORCIA, supra note 167, at 628-29 (noting that statutes of limitations are "not a
matter of right but legislative grace"); see also People ex rel. Reibman v. Warden, 275 N.Y.S.
59, 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934) (noting that criminal statutes of limitations may be changed or
repealed altogether in any case where right to acquittal has not been absolutely acquired by
completion oflimitations period); People v. Amann, 289 N.Y.S. 316,321 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1936)
(noting that criminal statutes of limitations are acts of grace and state may repeal such statutes);
Ill v. State, 171 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943) (noting that statutes of limitations
are measures of public policy and are subject to will of legislature).
235. See supra note 165 (noting that murder is typically not subject to statute of limita-
tions).
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Yet, this change in position reflects too much reliance on the value of DNA
evidence. These legislatures are tacitly saying that DNA is all that is neces-
sary for a conviction. DNA's identification value is extremely helpful in
many situations; however, it is not conclusive proof of guilt. A defendant
should not be deprived of his right to present an adequate defense simply
because a scientific test has determined that his genetic material was present
at a crime scene.
V Conclusion
The law enforcement officials who have used DNA warrants or indict-
ments have not attempted to shield their motives for resorting to such a tactic.
They have all made it very clear that the sole reason for charging a "John
Doe" with a specific genetic profile was to toll the statute of limitations to
extend the possibility of a future prosecution. Ifthe courts allow it, this tactic
is likely to result in the prosecution of some defendants who are brought to
trial many years after the commission of the crime. Before they get to trial,
however, these defendants are likely to challenge the DNA warrant or indict-
ment that tolled the statute of limitations in the first place.
In the first cases challenging DNA warrants or indictments, the courts
refused to dismiss the charges." 5 They concluded that a DNA profile meets
the "reasonable certainty" standard for descriptions in warrants or indict-
ments." 7 As more of these "John Does" are identified, additional challenges
are likely to arise, and the initial question faced by a court under such a chal-
lenge is whether the defendant's DNA profile meets the "reasonable certainty"
standard. If it is held not to meet this standard, then the warrant or indictment
is invalid and the statute of limitations was never tolled. On the other hand,
if other courts follow the lead of the California court that upheld a DNA
warrant,3 -the law enforcement tactic designed to toll the statute of limitations
will have worked and the prosecution will be able to continue.
However, this law enforcement tactic, along with the recent legislative
trend to eliminate statutes of limitations in sexual assault cases, raises serious
concerns regarding the commitment to the purposes served by these statutes.
These recent occurrences call into question many of the historical rationales
for having these statutes in the first place. 9 When a prosecutor obtains a
236. See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text (discussing first rulings on validity
of DNA warrants or indictments).
237. See supra notes 149-58 and accompanying text (discussing first rulings on validity
of DNA warrants or indictments).
238. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing California case that upheld
"John Doe" arrest warrant).
239. See supra Part IV.B (discussing purposes of statutes of limitations).
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DNA warrant or indictment to toll the statute of limitations, he essentially is
eliminating the limitations period for that case. Even when the legislature
makes this decision, the concerns that statutes of limitations traditionally ad-
dressed are still present. In both instances, the decisionmakers, both prosecu-
tors and legislators, are placing a tremendous amount of confidence in DNA's
ability to solve crimes when, in fact, one should not view DNA evidence as
conclusive proof of guilt.
Ultimately, the use of DNA warrants and indictments may be a short-
lived phenomena. As more DNA profiles are entered into databases and the
current backlogs diminish, the police should be able to match crime scene
DNA samples to known-offender DNA samples shortly after the crime2 40 In
the meantime, however, the use of DNA warrants and indictments and the
elimination of statutes of limitations could prejudice some defendants. Sta-
tutes of limitations are legislative attempts to balance the defendant's interest
in a fair trial against the state's interest in justice. Invariably, this balance is
sometimes imperfect, and some criminals may go unpunished due to the
statutory protection. However, the balance reached by statutes of limitations
is superior to the possible prejudice that may result from the present practices
of using DNA warrants and indictments, thereby eliminating these statutes of
limitations in sexual assault cases. In considering this balancing of interests,
perhaps Judge Learned Hand put it best when he wrote,
Certainly it is one thing to revive a prosecution already dead, and another
to give it a longer lease of life. The question turns upon how much vio-
lence is done to our instinctive feelings of justice and fair play. For the
state to assure a man that he has become safe from its pursuit, and thereaf-
ter to withdraw its assurance, seems to most of us unfair and dishonest.
But, while the chase is on, it does not shock us to have it extended beyond
the time first set, or, if it does, the stake forgives it.241
DNA warrants and indictments may be upheld because they are found to meet
the applicable legal standards, but in terms of policy, neither this DNA pro-
filing tactic nor the elimination of statutes of limitations strikes the proper
balance between the defendant's interests and the state's interests.
240. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing DNA databases).
241. Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420,425-26 (2d Cir. 1928).
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